

New Republic



MAY 16, 1949

WITH THIS ISSUE: SPECIAL 32-PAGE SECTION

HOW STRONG IS SOVIET RUSSIA?

***AN APPRAISAL BY EIGHTEEN
OUTSTANDING EXPERTS***

THE ROOSEVELT OR THE TIGER?
by GUS TYLER

HAROLD L. ICKES: ON TIDELANDS OIL

15¢

NEW REPUBLIC, MAY 16, 1949, IN TWO PARTS: PART ONE

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MAY 16, 1949

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SECTION TWO

A Special Section on:
How Strong Is Soviet Russia?

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WASHINGTON WIRE

SENATOR EASTLAND takes a long drag at his big cigar. "Thank you," he says. "Next witness." "Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth so help you God?" asks the clerk. "I do," says the woman. "Now, Mrs. Jackson," the clerk continues, "in the light of the policy laid down by the chairman of the judiciary subcommittee considering the Mundt-Ferguson bills to curb subversives, I ask the following: 'Are you or have you ever been a member of the Communist Party?'"

"No."

"Are you now or have you ever been a member of or affiliated in any way with any organization which has been cited by any governmental agency as a Communist organization, a Communist-front organization, or one substantially controlled, dominated or infiltrated by Communists?"

"No," says witness. She comes from Brooklyn, she says, representing the Bethel Baptist church and the Congress of American Women. The clerk pounces. The "Congress" is on the Attorney General's subversive list. Mrs. Jackson looks genuinely surprised. She says she didn't know it. We look at her more closely. She is a self-possessed Negro. She defends the "Congress." "There's a difference between what a thing really is and what people say about it," she says.

The chairman hesitates. These test questions of Communist affiliation are put to each witness. The second one would seemingly incriminate anybody who ever got into the same room with a Communist, including certain members of the Supreme Court. There is an unmistakable attitude of tension in the room. The big cops stand in the small chamber, looking ready for anything. We don't mind cops—like 'em, in fact—but these seem unnecessarily large, somehow. We don't like Com-

mies, but we must say the scene at the administration of this loyalty test gives us the creeps. Eastland relaxes, takes a long drag at his cigar. "No use ar-goo-ing," he tells the clerk. Witness proceeds. Later in the morning a spokesman for the anti-Communist ADA gives strong testimony against both bills. He charges that such measures aid rather than injure Communists.

Scene II. This is the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Only once or twice have these much heralded hearings on the Atlantic Treaty filled the hall. There is significance in the apathy; the public

takes approval for granted. A shrunken little man in a brown suit is testifying; gracious, this is former Ambassador to Germany, James W. Gerard, now 82. How time flies. Like anyone who has written for Hearst most of his life, Gerard talks in headlines. "Not to sign the pact means war in a year!" he croaks into the amplifier.

Anti-pact Senator Donnell tries to interrogate him. His amplified voice thunders from the marble walls. "What, what, what?" says Gerard. Questions are read back to him in his ear. "The need of the Senate to ratify the pact?" he repeats. "Just a technicality!" Donnell froths and fumes. But Gerard has blurted it out. Once the treaty was signed last month the Senate had little choice but to go along. That is no doubt one of the reasons why the spectator seats are so empty now.

Scene III. A carafe and tumbler sit at the right of picturesque, white-haired Senator McCarran, chairman of the appropriations subcommittee considering State Department funds. He looks pleased, and why not? He is holding Secretary of State Acheson captive below him. The hard-boiled committee occupies the semicircular dais in a scene that illustrates legisla-



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NEW REPUBLIC

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tive supremacy. Once a year executive department heads must appear before each chamber to justify proposed expenditures. They sit below, humble petitioners.

Few questions are put now to Acheson; his assistant, John E. Peurifoy, handles these matters. But McCarran insists on Acheson's presence. He must sit and hear his policies attacked. He was here yesterday, too. McCarran swells with power. Yesterday he demanded to know why we didn't recognize Spain?

He started to threaten. Unless Spain is recognized, he said, he will see that department appropriations are gone over with a fine-tooth comb. Few people in Washington are quite so crass and crude as McCarran, the Nevada silver-knuckle man. Delighted Republicans chime in: Wherry, Gurney, Bridges. They want aid to Spain, aid to Nationalist China, aid to German industries. Why isn't the State Department aiding all three?

Questions are thrown at Peurifoy about "subversives" in his department. They are aiming through Peurifoy at Acheson. He sits imperturbable. Peurifoy is quick and smiling. McCarran rumbles a demand for the names of everybody in the department connected with formulating Far Eastern policy "since 1930." Gracious, that's 18 years; quite a chore. Peurifoy quickly promises it.

McCarran glances covertly at Acheson. The latter sits bland and impassive; this won't do at all. Can the Secretary come back again this afternoon?

The Secretary replies that, well, there are engagements. . . . Well, then, will the Secretary hold himself in town from now on, ready for a call? Unfortunately, in two weeks he must leave the country, Acheson suavely explains; there's a little foreign ministers' meeting over in Paris. . . . McCarran looks as though this was a put-up job by the UN to evade him. "We'll have you up here again, before then," he says grimly.

T. R. B.

Washington

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THE LESSON OF THE DEFEAT

THE MARGIN of our victory on November 2 was the measure of our defeat on May 3. It is now clear that full and complete repeal of the Taft-Hartley Act is not likely to come until labor and liberals have strengthened the progressive Democratic majority in Congress through at least one more national election. Improvements on Taft-Hartley can be won from this Congress; T-H extinction will require more liberal votes than the election assured.

Administration forces narrowly escaped a complete rout. Only a last-minute move to recommit the bill to committee, and probable oblivion, prevented adoption of the Wood bill, fully as bad as T-H itself. Main responsibility for the Democratic failure goes to Secretary of Labor Tobin, for premature and maladroit efforts to compromise, and to Speaker Sam Rayburn, for lack of support of the President's program. Secretary Tobin infected leading House Democrats and even a number of labor leaders with his own fear and uncertainty. Instead of leading the anti-Taft-Hartley army, he disrupted it by talking terms with the enemy before the battle began. Speaker Rayburn stated on the House floor that he never had approved of the Thomas-Lesinski bill supported by the President; that the substitute he arranged to have introduced by Hugo Sims (S. C.), retaining T-H provisions for injunctions and non-Communist affidavits, was his idea of proper labor legislation.

President Truman never deviated publicly from his 1948 campaign line. The Democratic platform said: "We advocate repeal of the Taft-Hartley Act." It said nothing about compromise in the spirit of Taft-Hartley. And to his credit, President Truman rebuked his Secretary of Labor when Tobin proposed weakening the Thomas-Lesinski bill. After that, Rayburn took over.

Labor divided. The strongest and best conducted labor lobby ever assembled on Capitol Hill, perhaps 600 strong, was outnumbered by the 13,300 delegates to the convention of Chambers of Commerce who spent most of the crucial week in Congressional corridors. But there was at least one labor representative in Washington from almost every Congressional district. Their united force, however, was not felt except on the final proposition of sending the bill back to committee. Lobbyists representing John L. Lewis, A. F. Whitney's

Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen and the left-wing unions of the CIO told House members that the substitute Sims bill, containing the power of injunction, was definitely unacceptable to them. At the same time, lobbyists for the majority of CIO unions, including the United Steelworkers, the Textile Workers' Union, the United Auto Workers and the national CIO organization, urged every Representative they could reach to vote for Sims' substitute measure as the least of the evils. The AFL's chief legislative representative, Lewis Hines, stayed away from the cloakrooms during the fight over the Sims bill.

Philip Murray, William Green and Truman stood above the battle, publicly uncompromising in principle, privately reconciled to their lieutenants' maneuvers.

Without active intervention by these three, the "unofficial" Administration measure never had a chance. When the Sims amendment failed by 28 votes (183-211), with 11 usually pro-labor Democrats voting with the Dixie-GOP's, the last resistance to passage of the Wood substitute bill appeared gone. The three-vote margin by which the Administration turned the tide again the next day and recommitted the whole question came from conservative Southerners. With his personal, as well as Administration, prestige at stake, Rayburn and lieutenants like Albert Gore of Tennessee poured on the pressure all night long, and, with White House assistants like John Steelman helping out at last, were able to win over enough votes to stave off total defeat.

The battle now moves to the Senate. An entirely new labor bill will be written on the floor, doubtless combining various features of the Administration's proposed measure, the bill Senator Taft will offer and proposals by the liberal Republican Senators Morse and Ives. Chances are that the bill which will come out of the Senate will be a considerable improvement over Taft-Hartley but will still not be acceptable to labor.

Labor itself seems likely to remain split on the desirability of supporting such a compromise measure if and when the opportunity comes again in this session. A highly influential group in the CIO believes that labor cannot stand another two years of life under the present Taft-Hartley Act. They say that unions which

are still operating under union-shop contracts entered into before T-H have not realized the depleting effect which expiration of these contracts in the next few months is going to have. A final end to the union shop and check-off would drain union treasuries in the two years before a new Congress could be put in, would make it harder for the unions to hold their members or get new ones. Labor has got by as well as it has under Taft-Hartley in the past two years, the exponents of compromise legislation say, because we have had no great unemployment. Making as much money as they were, industries did not want to close their plants for a showdown with the unions. With production backlogs piling up in consumer goods, however, companies like General Electric soon will have enough supplies on hand to keep doing business for the months needed to make war on the CIO.

This school of thought in the CIO will urge continued negotiations to obtain a modified emergency-strike provision which would provide for government seizure where employers lock out workers as well as injunctions in cases where employees strike.

Others argue that such political concessions now would mean disastrous economic concessions later, that industry would interpret such action by Murray, in particular, as an admission of weakness and would stiffen accordingly its own attitude in the bargaining over new contracts this year.

And most important of all, to compromise the issue in Congress now is to compromise labor's political prospects in 1950. With a clear record of unyielding opposition to Taft-Hartley by itself and the Administration it helped to carry to power, and with T-H still on the books, labor can go to the country next year with reasonable expectation of increasing its representation

in the 82nd Congress. Labor's political-action groups point with pride to the small rate of defection among the men they helped elect in 1948. Only five out of the 168 House members endorsed by the CIO-PAC last year voted for the anti-labor Wood bill and against sending the measure back to committee. Instead of the 79 votes against Taft-Hartley which labor was able to muster in the 80th Congress, there were 203 votes against the Wood bill. Even among the Southerners there was marked improvement. Only one out of ten Southern Democrats voted with labor on Taft-Hartley; better than one out of three did so on the Wood bill.

The first encounter between the friends and enemies of labor in the 81st Congress was little credit to any of the parties involved. The Administration would have done much better to follow the absolutely clear position which Truman enunciated. The Democratic Party should understand that the Taft-Hartley Act is wrong in principle and must therefore be uprooted.

Senator Wayne Morse has accurately appraised the opportunities now open to the Democrats:

The coalition which produced the Wood bill was an unfortunate mistake. . . . American organized labor is going to be in politics with renewed energy and determination in the elections of 1950-52. . . . The opposition against Taft-Hartley is going to be from the rank and file of labor by the millions, because the rank and file of American workers could not possibly accept many of the provisions of the Wood bill.

It took 20 years for the British people to get rid of the infamous Trades Disputes Act after it was imposed on them. It may take the American people beyond 1950, or even beyond 1952, to get rid of the Taft-Hartley chains. The important thing is to keep trying.

THE WEEK

MORATORIUM FOR TRUSTS

Lobbyists for the cement trust, US Steel and other major segments of big business are putting heavy pressure on Congress to push through legislation which would temporarily nullify recent Supreme Court decisions outlawing the basing-point system.

One year ago this April the Supreme Court found that the cement trust, over a period of years, had used certain elements of the base-point pricing

system—such as freight absorption, phantom freight, and uniform pricing—to strangle competition, and declared such practices to be direct violations of our anti-trust laws. The Supreme Court has now gone even further in the Rigid Steel Conduit case, holding that the Federal Trade Commission is free to issue cease-and-desist orders banning the use of basing-point prices in other industries as well, even without proving collusive action by the individual companies involved.

Both of these decisions greatly strengthen the hand of the FTC, since price conspiracy is often difficult to prove in court. The Commission now merely needs to show that individual companies in an industry are knowingly following a "common course of action" in absorbing freight costs to meet competition in order to stop this practice.

Cries of protest from the monopolists immediately arose. Enforcement of this new doctrine by the FTC, they

claimed, would upset traditional pricing methods not only of steel and cement but also paper, food, chemicals and many other large industries. Their lobbyists are openly attempting in every way that they can to prevent the FTC from carrying out the decisions. But the big-business forces are putting their main hope in Congress to undo the Supreme Court decision, or, at least, tie the hands of the FTC until new ways can be devised to evade anti-trust laws.

The legislation they are supporting would ban all FTC actions against businessmen who individually and in "good faith" use delivered price systems and freight-absorption practices until July 1, 1950. While the Clayton Anti-Trust Act prohibits price discrimination by forbidding large companies from cutting prices below those of local companies, thus putting many small concerns out of business, the new bill would permit this unfair competition. The legislation would, in effect, remove all price discrimination from government control.

By heavy pressuring, the "moratorium" bill has already been rushed through both the Senate and House Judiciary Committees. Only two members of the Senate Committee—William Langer (R, N. D.) and Forrest C. Donnell (R, Mo.)—opposed the measure. Administration Senators offered no opposition at all. A special committee, headed by Homer Capehart (R, Ind.), had paved the way for the new bill with lengthy investigations throughout the past year, designed to show that the earlier Court decision would not promote competition and would actually encourage monopoly. (Some of the monopoly industry's biggest names were members of a special "Advisory Council" to the Capehart committee.)

The House Judiciary Committee without even bothering to hold hearings, reported the bill favorably, despite protests from the National Farmers' Union, the National Federation of Small Business and other groups opposing the moratorium. And in the face of a *Journal of Commerce*

prediction that: "If Congress approves the moratorium bill in its present form, it is expected that the steel and cement industries, which abandoned freight absorption a year ago, will resume that practice immediately."

Meanwhile, the House Appropriations Committee has quietly dealt the FTC another blow. In 1941 the Commission budget provided for 741 staff positions. The GOP 80th Congress cut the appropriation to reduce that number to 681. Last week the House subcommittee handling the appropriation for the dangerously understaffed FTC, again cut the number of positions—to 600. The monopolists can relax a bit now. The FTC, already struggling under a backlog of hundreds of pending cases, cannot possibly devote the time it should to new cases resulting from the Supreme Court decisions.

SUBSTANDARD EDUCATION

As the Senate, for the second time under the Truman Administration, passed the Federal Aid to Education bill, these facts about our educational crises were again emphasized:

¶ This year at least two million of our 25 million school children are receiving a substandard education because of poorly prepared teachers and because of a widespread shortage of teachers and facilities. One teacher in nine in the public schools is serving on an emergency or substandard certificate.

¶ Thousands of children are attending part-time schools. According to US Census estimates, about four million children between the ages of five and seventeen, inclusive, attend no school whatever.

¶ Estimates made last year indicated that 43 percent of the teachers in public schools were paid less than \$2,400 for the year; 12 percent had scheduled salaries of less than \$1,600.

¶ Expenditures per student ranged from less than \$50 in Mississippi to more than \$200 in New York.

Senator Frank P. Graham (D, N. C.), former president of the University of North Carolina who took

his seat only a few weeks ago, summarized the education dilemma this way: "The people have long been calling. Congress has long been stalling."

Congress has stalled in the past because of three highly controversial aspects of the education bill: parochial and private schools have lobbied for a share of the aid, Negro groups have urged anti-discrimination amendments bitterly opposed by the Southerners, and states'-righters have stubbornly fought aid from the federal government.

The bill, passed by the Senate 58 to 15, ironed out most of these differences. The parochial schools had been included in the school health bill, passed by the Senate the previous week, placating churchmen in advance. And under the education bill, providing \$300 million a year in federal grants to states to equalize public schools, the states which have in the past given aid to parochial and private schools could continue to do so.

The amendment, introduced by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge (R, Mass.), to deny federal education aid to states which segregate Negroes and whites in their public schools, was defeated 65 to 16. Administration leaders and Republicans, many of whom are strong supporters of President Truman's civil-rights program, opposed the anti-bias rider, knowing that it would ultimately defeat the legislation.

To appease the states'-righters, the bill specifically prohibits any federal agency or officer from exercising any direction, supervision or control over any school, educational agency or institution with reference to expenditures made under this law.

Administration leaders defeated all attempts to change the nature of the bill or cut the appropriation. As the measure now stands, federal grants would vary from \$5 per child in the high-income states to about \$29 per child in the lowest-income states. Within each state, the neediest school districts would have a prior claim to federal aid to help them achieve a minimum educational program. The

bill establishes a minimum program of \$55 per year per pupil. In states where separate public schools are maintained for separate races, federal funds must be used for the benefit of minority groups in an amount which is not less than the proportion that such minority race in the state bears to its total population.

The Senate passed an education bill very similar to this one, 58 to 22, last year too. But it died in the House Education and Labor Committee, at the end of the session. Chances seem much better on the House side this year, but it may be some time before the Labor Committee, which is carrying a large share of the burden of Truman's legislative program, even gets around to holding hearings.

LET 'EM EAT TAXES

HARRISBURG (NR correspondent)

Governor James H. Duff, Pennsylvania's red-headed Republican, has become so embroiled in local v. state taxes that his chances of unseating Democratic Senator Francis J. Myers in 1950, as was the GOP plan, have been seriously injured.

With the blessing of old-guard Republicans, Duff pushed through the 1947 legislature a law which gave Pennsylvania's 2,500 school districts and 1,000 municipalities—starved for local income—power to tax anything not taxed by the state. Local officials took their new power to heart and taxed everything from cinders and signs to the digging, transporting and handling of coal. When the operators cried that the state's coal industry faced ruinous taxation, Duff was forced to yield, and during this session of the legislature supported another bill, sponsored by the Pennsylvania Manufacturers' Association and the Economy League, restricting taxing powers on coal, manufactured products, farm produce, minerals or natural resources. What's left to tax? Income and wages and retail sales, which hit the workman whose votes the comparatively liberal Duff will have to win away from Senator Myers in order to take his job.

OUTSIDE AMERICA


Exploitation of Iraq's rich Kirkuk oil basin was parceled among British, American and French interests by the Red Line Agreement of 1927. The British dominated the deal, as they did at the time most of the Middle East: they had 52.5 percent of the stock of the combine (of which five percent was held by Calouste Gulbenkian, Levantine *éminence grise* and a British subject) and they controlled the only means of transport—the trans-Iranian pipeline through Palestine to Haifa on the Mediterranean—by RAF planes based at Habbaniya and by Glubb Pasha's legion in Transjordan.

The Americans set out to redress the balance by developing the fields in Saudi Arabia. The biggest obstacle was means of transport. The Anglo-Iranian Company, of which 51 percent of stock is held by the British Admiralty, had more than a million tons of tankers and was building ships regularly. On the other hand, the tankers available to the Americans were being used in the Gulf of Mexico and South American runs or in the Atlantic. The Arabian American Company (Aramco) was forced to ship most of its production in non-American tankers, mostly British. At the mercy therefore of their British competitors, the Americans couldn't get anywhere near their potential production of 50 million tons.

The problem of independent means of American transport was put up to Washington. It was one of the factors in the row between the Navy and the Army. The Navy, arguing that the Indian Ocean would be too dangerous, in wartime, wanted the Saudi oil brought to a Mediterranean port by a new pipeline. The Army balked at the problem of protecting such a pipeline, and came out in favor of building

tankers that could enter and use both the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean. A compromise was reached. Twenty fast tankers were planned. In addition, a pipeline across the desert to the Mediterranean also was planned, this to be protected by a chain of airfields from Libya to the Persian Gulf. (Which, by the way, explains in part why the Italians won't get back their North African colonies.)

But the British controlled all the possible termini of such a pipeline, and they used this control: in 1947 they and the Americans formed a company to build not one but two pipelines, one for the Anglo-Iranian oil, the other for the Saudi-American production. The construction was impossible, however, without American materials beyond those provided to Britain under the Marshall Plan, and the Americans refused to furnish such materials unless the British paid by yielding political controls in the Near East-



ern oil areas. The British wouldn't agree. The Americans went ahead on their own. But every time they seemed on the point of making a satisfactory agreement about passage or terminal rights with local authorities, some unforeseen event took place and forced a halt. The Egyptian tax on oil was such an event. So was the war in Palestine, started by the Arab invasion.

Recently the prospects for American success seemed unusually good. The British and Americans were working together harmoniously in the Mediterranean. Washington supported London on the Italian colonies and on British control of the great secret military installations in Cyrenaica. In Algiers, the British-Mexican Petroleum Company of London got together with the Anglo-American Oil Company, an affiliate of Standard Oil of New Jersey, to finance the construction of the largest fuel oil depot in the Mediterranean. In Tunisia, Gulf Oil and Shell (Anglo-Dutch) worked together in getting from the French government

a 14-year concession for exploiting 65 percent of the oil rights. The Suez Canal Company's 1948 year-end statistics showed that 60 percent of all traffic was in petroleum products, 63 percent of the shipping tonnage was of freighters. From Aramco's fields 6,920,000 barrels were shipped; from Iran 6,560,000 barrels; from Kuwait (Gulf and Anglo-Iranian) 6,034,000. Shipments to the United States in December, 1948, were four and a half times those in December, 1947.

During the early part of 1949 the American prospects appeared to be improving even more: the war in Palestine was ending with an Arab defeat; Lebanon needed help and King Ibn Saud said it would be forthcoming only as the price of agreeing to the American pipeline; the Syrian government had not only agreed to the pipeline but was openly entering the American political sphere of influence. Then Colonel Hosni el Zayim, a Kurd, who had backed Vichy in 1940 and served some years in prison, took over the Syrian government by a coup d'état in the name of "true democracy." Both in London and in Paris, insiders had no great difficulty in recognizing this "unexpected" event as a victory for British oil interests and a setback for the Americans. Edouard Sablier of the Paris *Monde* called attention to the satisfaction felt by circles at the Quai D'Orsay, but pointed out:

There is no question of permanently blocking American plans—which would be inconceivable—but to bring about a slowup that would make the American companies accept a New Deal of Near Eastern oil, redistributing it proportionately among the three parties. . . . Recent events show the development of two axes in the Arab world, one based on Washington, one on London. . . . Every time the supporters of "Greater Syria" deny their activity, there are strong chances that a new phase is beginning.

A new phase also seems to be beginning elsewhere in the world: the fact that General Clay of the American Army has won in Germany is not unconnected with the approach of Communist armies to China's oil reserves.

PERCY WINNER

THE ROOSEVELT OR THE TIGER

by Gus Tyler

"WHEN A COSTELLO can tell a Roosevelt that he can't have the Democratic Party nomination, then thank God for the Liberal Party."

That's the way FDR Jr. opened his campaign for Congress in the 20th Congressional District in New York to fill the seat of the late Sol Bloom. And in this colorful sentence, Roosevelt summarized all the perplexities of the liberal in New York County. FDR is a regular Democrat with a capital "D." He has loyally supported the party. Rarely did he appear before a gathering of independent liberals, the Liberal Party, or even the ADA without somehow, somewhere, proclaiming his "regularity." Yet, here is this same Roosevelt running on the lines of the Liberal Party and the specially created Four Freedoms Party against Justice Ben Shalleck, regular candidate of the Democratic Party.

Why? The answer lies in the peculiar configuration known as New York County politics.

At 8:25 a.m., August 24, New York Supreme Court nominee Thomas Aurelio picked up his phone and called Frank Costello, known as czar of the slot-machine racket and banker for numerous gambling enterprises.

The previous night, the Democratic Party of New York County had nominated Aurelio for the judicial post.

"Good morning, Francesco," began the delighted candidate. "How are you? And thanks for everything."

"Congratulations," answered Costello. "It went over perfect. *When I say something is in the bag, you can rest assured.*"

"It was perfect," continued the judge-to-be. "Arthur Klein did the nominating. First me, then Cavagan, then Peck. It was fine."

This tête-à-tête took place in 1943. Publication of this celebrated wire-tap established the control of Tammany Hall by Costello, described by District Attorney Hogan as "an ex-convict and underworld leader" and as an associate

of Lucky Luciano, Louis (Lepke) Buchalter, Jacob (Gurrah) Shapiro, Joe Adonis, and "other gangsters."

To make certain that the public understood the nature of Costello's grip on Tammany Hall, Hogan spelled it out in terms of the Aurelio nomination: "Costello had been busy on Aurelio's behalf for some time. He was in daily touch, personally and by telephone, with Bert Stand, Secretary of the New York County Democratic Committee, and Clarence Neal, Democratic leader of the 16th A. D."

It was in August, 1943, that one of the crucial factors in New York politics was established: the control of Tammany Hall by Costello. That control has remained unbroken and constitutes an important part of the background of FDR Jr.'s present campaign.

A second major factor is the Aurelio incident.

On the very night that Aurelio got Tammany's blessing, the American Labor Party, meeting at the Hotel Astor, made its nomination. The name of Thomas Aurelio was placed before the body by the lieutenants of Marcantonio—Samuel Mancuso and Peter Rizzo. To give Aurelio a leftish coloration, Marcantonio announced that Aurelio was a member of the Communist-front United Americans of Italian Origin. When the ALP, then dominated by right-wing forces under the leadership of Alex Rose, of the Hatters' Union, and the Garment Workers' David Dubinsky, overrode Marcantonio's choice to nominate Matthew Levy, the left-wingers blasted the latter's candidacy.

These two factors have placed New York County liberals in an uneasy relationship with the Democratic Party. Liberals with their eyes on federal politics have been eager to elect Democratic Representatives in preference to Republicans. Yet liberals have been increasingly aware that the nominating machinery of the Democratic Party is in the hands of Frank Costello.

For a while, it appeared that Tam-

many might be ripped apart by an internal struggle: the battle between the Irish and the Italians. The latter are a relatively new element in organized New York politics. They have challenged the erstwhile monopoly of Tammany by the Irish, who are reluctant to step down for a new top dog.

Mayor O'Dwyer has on several occasions relied on this split to get Tammany to go along with his policies. (O'Dwyer's main base is in Brooklyn. Although he is dependent upon the county machine for city-wide support, he is not entirely at its mercy.)

In January, 1945, a minor rebellion occurred in Tammany. Five district leaders sent a telegram to Attorney General Francis Biddle, urging him to turn down all federal patronage for the Hall because it was run by Costello. The revolt, carried on inside the Hall, too, was squashed, largely because of the voting setup then prevalent in Tammany. Of the 26 votes, 16 went to District Leaders and 10 were ex-officio; that is, the men were appointed by the leader of Tammany. In the quarrel, one of the big issues was the matter of who was ready to make what kind of deal with Marcantonio.

In July of that year, the close working relationships between Tammany and Marcantonio became apparent when Tammany endorsed a Communist, Benjamin Davis, for the City Council. Here O'Dwyer stepped in and, it is believed, with the added pressure of the Cardinal's office—referred to in Tammany circles as "The Powerhouse"—forced the Democratic Party to drop Davis.

O'Dwyer was dragged into the fight again the following summer when the Italian faction made Tammany withdraw the nomination of Elmer F. Quinn as state senator and substitute Louis J. Capozzoli. Mayor O'Dwyer got Quinn reinstated as the nominee.

Yet, there was no peace in Tammany. Twelve district leaders were demanding the abolition of the 10 ex-officio posts. They were up in arms because Francis X. Mancuso, Tammany boss of the 18th (Marcantonio's) Congressional District, had publicly announced that Tammany's candidate



DRAWINGS BY NEUWIRTH

for the Congressional nomination in the 18th District was Vito Marcantonio. O'Dwyer backed up this group in its demand to abolish the posts.

The insurgents won. Sampson was made new head of Tammany Hall. The ten appointive posts were abolished. The Mayor, who had been starving the Hall, now put it back at the patronage table. For a few short weeks, New York liberals rejoiced, hopeful that the Democratic Party of New York County might have cleansed itself. But their hope was short-lived.

In June of 1948, Tammany's new leader, Frank Sampson, let it be known that he did not want ALP endorsement of any Manhattan candidates. That announcement set off the fireworks. The Costello-Mancuso wing of the party immediately announced that it wished to nominate State Supreme Court Justice Louis A. Valente for the powerful patronage post of Surrogate because Valente would have Marcantonio's backing.

To block this nomination, Sampson proposed the name of Vincent Impel-

litteri, president of the City Council, and also an Italian. But the real powers in Tammany—Mancuso, DeSapio, Costello—would have none of it. They offered a "compromise" in the person of Francis L. Valente, nephew of the other Valente.

O'Dwyer was enraged:

There have been for upwards of a year, ugly rumors that a majority bloc of Tammany leaders have made up their minds to get their own jobs so they can squeeze the properties of the widows and orphans for an additional tax in the form of patronage to Democratic clubhouses, leaders.

It was then that he referred to the National Democratic Club (Tammany) as a "political cesspool."

Through Sampson, O'Dwyer announced new patronage machinery. "Leave the present Tammany in the gutter where it belongs," he said. "I will have nothing to do with the scavengers who plan to get rich on orphans' money." (The surrogacy handles wills affecting widows and orphans.)

The Mayor began to fire men from the public payroll—left and right, both figuratively and politically. He called upon Hugo Rogers, Manhattan Borough President, to follow suit. It looked as if Tammany was finished.

But within a few weeks—three, to be exact—a rapprochement was affected. Valente was withdrawn. General Sessions Judge John A. Mullen was nominated instead. Frank Sampson was removed as head of Tammany. Hugo Rogers took over. Tammany Hall was still in business—under the old management. Almost symbolic of the new arrangement was the candidacy of Paul O'Dwyer, the Mayor's brother, for a Congressional seat from the 21st C.D. Paul was a Democrat about whom the Sampson Democrats were less than lukewarm and about whom the American Labor Party was downright hot. He was counsel for several left-wing unions. He was a sure winner against his Republican opponent, Jacob Javits.

In the 1948 election, New York County liberals began to devise a new pattern to smash Tammany. The at-

tempt to do it from within had failed. The idea now was to weaken the Hall from without.

The prime mover in this strategy was New York's Liberal Party. Its first step was to endorse Javits against O'Dwyer. Mathematically, this policy made no sense, since the combined Democratic-ALP vote was considerably greater than the Republican-Liberal Party vote. Politically, however, the policy turned out to be highly successful because of the comparatively great number of liberal Democrats and independent voters in New York County who are ready to swing to the Liberal Party line in order to lick Tammany and/or defeat the ALP. In addition, there is reason to believe that the Sampson Democrats threw their weight to Javits. The election result was startling: Truman swept the district; Paul O'Dwyer was defeated; the Liberal Party, generally good for 8,000 to 10,000 votes, polled 20,000.

The same pattern proved effective in opposing Tammany's candidate for Surrogate, John Mullen. Mullen did not have the official endorsement of the American Labor Party, whose candidate was O. John Rogge. But Mullen did have the active support of Marcantonio's workers in several key districts, where a study of the election results makes it clear that Democratic Party leaders threw their strength to Marcantonio while ALP workers cut Rogge to aid Mullen. Nevertheless, Tammany lost this richest of all patronage plums when George Frankenthaler, Republican, got into office, thanks again to the 62,000 votes cast on the Liberal Party line.

A study of Liberal Party endorsements of candidates for minor office—Assembly and State Senate—reveals that the Javits and Frankenthaler backing was part of an over-all policy. Wherever the so-called Sampson forces nominated a candidate for state legislature, the Liberal Party in New York County gave its approval. Wherever Tammany nominated, the Liberal Party encouraged the GOP to offer an acceptable "liberal" or, failing that, the Liberal Party ran its own candidate.

Curiously enough, while the Liberal Party was fighting the official Democratic machine in New York County, it—and the pro-Truman unions—became the most effective campaigners for the reelection of the President.

The policy of Tammany Hall in the election of 1948 was to dump Truman, make deals with the American



Labor Party for support of Congressional candidates and pour all available energies into the campaign to win the surrogacy. The policy was disheartening to the non-Communist, liberal Democrats in New York County. A number of younger members set up the Fair Deal Democrats, a purely New York County organization, prepared to contest primaries and party control with the Wigwam. They were headed by Joseph Broderick, president of the New York Young Democrats.

In the various movements to tame the Tammany Tiger—the Sampson opposition from within the Hall, the Fair Deal Democrats from within the party, and the Liberal Party from without—nobody had calculated on Sol Bloom's death. When the vacancy occurred, however, the liberal forces moved quickly. Leaders of the Liberal Party promised backing to FDR Jr. Rapidly, endorsements of his candidacy piled up: from Mayor O'Dwyer, from ex-Governor Lehman, from Senator Wagner. The Amalgamated Clothing Workers spoke up. The CIO-PAC spoke up. The ADA and the Fair Deal Democrats sounded off. Robert Blaikie, insurgent Democrat and official leader of the 7th Assembly District, announced his support.

Since there is no regular primary in a special election, this massing of en-

dorsements for Roosevelt was the only means of pressuring the Democratic Party of New York County to nominate FDR Jr. But the Hall was unmoved. An innocuous judge was taken from the bench and entered on the ballot under the Democratic star. The candidate's name was unimportant. This election was to be machine-made.

Shalleck, Tammany candidate, is getting left-handed support from Dr. Annette Rubinstein, American Labor Party candidate. The Communist *Daily Worker* applauded Tammany for "resisting the Liberal Party's attempts to dictate its candidate." While opposing all candidates except Dr. Rubinstein, the *Worker* reserved its sharpest barbs for Roosevelt. "Most outspoken of the war candidates is Franklin D. Roosevelt Jr.," says the *DW*. When Mayor O'Dwyer called upon Roosevelt to investigate NAACP charges of police brutality (Roosevelt is chairman of the Mayor's Committee on Unity), Dr. Rubinstein charged that the simple appointment of FDR Jr. to investigate was proof that "my Liberal Party opponent is getting ready to serve the Mayor in covering up police-brutality charges as part of an understanding to obtain the Mayor's support." Marcantonio and Henry Wallace went into the district to campaign against Roosevelt.

In the overwhelmingly Democratic 20th District (Bloom polled 63,764 of the 120,000 votes on the Democratic line in 1948), FDR Jr. needed only a big turnout to win. Behind him were an active labor coalition—the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, the United Hat, Cap and Milliners, the Transport Workers' Union, the National Maritime Union, the International Association of Machinists, Local 338 of the Retail Clerks, and dozens of other unions. They were joined by the Americans for Democratic Action, the Young Democrats and the Blaikie organization. The aim of the Roosevelt supporters was to put another nail in the coffin of what Morris Ernst called "this triple alliance of Communists, Tammany politicians and mobsters."

THE TRENTON MURDER CASE

SIX YOUNG NEGROES are in prison in Trenton, New Jersey, awaiting execution for murder. There is grave doubt as to the guilt of all six, and not more than three men were ever involved, in any way, by the state's uncontested evidence. The story of the six is a remarkable commentary on justice as it is practised, sometimes, in the US, as well as a murder mystery for which the solution has not yet been found.

William Horner, old and feeble, lived in a run-down area on North Broad Street in Trenton. At 73, he had a wife and six children, but he was separated from his wife, and had been living for many years with a woman much younger than himself, Miss Elizabeth McGuire. Horner kept a second-hand store consisting of two small, hopelessly crowded rooms on the main floor of a little two-story house.

On the morning of January 27, 1948, three Negroes, according to the story told by Miss McGuire, entered the store and two of them asked Horner to show them a mattress in the rear room. The third man stayed in the front room with Miss McGuire. She felt a severe blow on the head and lost consciousness; when she came to, the three Negroes were gone, and Horner, in the back room, was dying of a fractured skull. He had been struck with a soda-pop bottle, which was left lying on the floor.

Trenton at that time had been the scene of a number of crimes of violence, and the citizenry was aroused. A local newspaper had recently published an editorial entitled "The Idle Electric Chair," and had scolded the police for not dealing properly with "the increasing boldness and viciousness of the criminal elements of Trenton." The police had responded as they always do under these circumstances. They had established a heavily armed, motorized bandit squad with orders to "shoot to kill." What amounted to a curfew had been set up in Trenton's sizable Negro district.

by Bruce Bliven

Eight days after Horner was killed, Collis English, the first of the six Negroes, was arrested. At 23, he is a war veteran with malaria and a rheumatic heart. He was not picked up in connection with the Horner murder, but on his father's complaint that he had been using the family automobile without permission. He was arrested early one evening, and when he did not come home that night, his brother-in-law, McKinley Forrest, went to the police station expecting to attend his trial in traffic court. (Walking into the police station hardly seems like the action of a man with the guilt of murder on his soul.) Forrest, also, was arrested, and never came home again.

Four days later, at four o'clock in the morning, police pounded on the door of the house where English and Forrest lived, and demanded "all the men in the house." The only man there was John McKenzie, Forrest's nephew. He, too, is now in the death house.

On the previous day, or February 7, the other three men had been picked up, without warrants. In several cases, the police identified men whom they were about to arrest by nicknames, which were uniformly wrong. These other three men are Ralph Cooper, Horace Wilson and James Thorpe.

All six of these men are manual workers, at the bottom of the social scrap-heap. Two of them are illiterate;

only one of the six can really be said to read and write. One (Thorpe) had had an arm amputated in a hospital ten days before he was arrested and had been out of the hospital only a few days.

For four days and five nights five of these six men were kept incommunicado and "questioned" by the police, sometimes singly, sometimes in groups of two or more; at the end of that time the police announced that five of the six had signed confessions. I have put quotation marks around the word "questioned," because it is hardly an adequate description of what went on. These men were grilled hour after hour, day and night, with threats of punishment, with the enormous psychological prestige of the white man over the Negro, the safe over the insecure, the policeman over the frightened, timid, slum dweller, who all his life has seen, not justice but coercion looming at the end of a nightstick.

There seems no doubt that the 23-year-old English, with malaria and rheumatic heart, was questioned continuously for 19 hours. Thorpe, eight days out of the hospital, says the police threatened to hit him. He said about the confession he signed, "I was afraid they would whup me if I didn't sign it. . . . I heard people hollering in there, that is why I was afraid—people hollering in daytime and at night, so that people were hollering." What Thorpe means is that he heard the sounds of people being beaten by the police. These sounds may or may not have been genuine, but in either case the effect on Thorpe would be the same.

English said, "They put words in my mouth and said I did this and did that, and forced me to sign a statement that wasn't true." He told his sister, Mrs. Bessie Mitchell, who asked why he had signed a confession, "I swear to God I never killed that man. I don't know anything about it. I never even seen the store where it happened." The other three defend-



ants who had signed confessions also repudiated them, with similar stories. Consider, for example, the testimony of police captain Andrew F. Delate on the case of Thorpe:

Q. Was he requested to sign the statement?

A. Then he was questioned by Dr. Sullivan if that was true; James Thorpe said no.

Doc Sullivan said, "If it's not true, if you sign that, you're signing your life away. Why did you make it?"

Q. What did James Thorpe say then?

A. James Thorpe then made a remark about how much time [in prison] he would receive. That's when you stood up and told him that there was no promises made whether he signed it or he didn't sign. And by that time Collis English appeared in the doorway, and Thorpe said, "All right, I'll sign"; so he signed the statement.

As a matter of fact, all six of the defendants had alibis which seem impressive to me. Collis English was cashing a veteran's disability check at a store near his home when the crime was being committed, and was seen there by neighbors; the Horner store was in a different part of the city. Ralph Cooper was at the home of a girl friend. He reported that while he was there a mailman delivered a C.O.D. package, a fact which the mailman verified. James Thorpe, the man with one arm, was seen by a number of people in front of his house, watching his uncle repair a car. Horace Wilson was working seven miles away; his statement to this effect is supported by his employer and by payroll records. McKinley Forrest was working; his employer sent him to the bank to make a deposit, and both the employer and the deposit book verify this fact. John McKenzie was also at work, as several people testified.

The prosecution put on the stand two identification witnesses. One of them was Elizabeth McGuire, of whom more later. The other was Frank Eldracher, whose car was parked near the store. He saw two Negroes come out of the store, close the door and walk down the street. He was able to identify none of the six defendants.

The defense put on the stand Mrs. Virginia Barclay, who lived across the

street from the Horner store and happened to be looking out the window at the time of the murder. She reported that she saw three Negroes run to a car, a four-door blue-green Plymouth. She did not identify any of the defendants. Her testimony is of importance because the police claimed they had arrested English after seeing him drive "the murder car." English had been driving only a two-door black Ford sedan.

As for Miss McGuire, at first she could not identify any of the six defendants; but four months later, in the course of the trial, she claimed to be able to do so. She admitted the police had shown her photographs of these six men. In such cases it is almost universal police custom to show a number of photographs and ask the identifying witness to pick out the one she accuses. On the contrary, Miss McGuire was shown six photographs and only six.

The murder was supposed to be part of a robbery; yet \$1,642 was found untouched in Horner's pockets.

Horner was killed, as already stated, with a soda-water bottle. There should have been fingerprints on this bottle. Yet the prosecution, making a great mystery of the matter, refused to give attorneys for the defendants the report of the fingerprint experts.

Elizabeth McGuire identified one of the accused as having visited the store on a previous occasion, and as having signed a receipt for her. But the man she identified cannot read or write.

In view of all this, why did a New Jersey jury find the men guilty? It was undoubtedly because of the five confessions. I have already indicated some of the conditions which preceded the making of the confessions by these exhausted, bullyragged, frightened young Negroes. At the trial, they were



DRAWINGS BY BERNARDA BRYSON

represented by counsel appointed by the court. Confronted by the confessions, the jury brought in a verdict which in each case consisted of the single word, "guilty." This verdict, incidentally, violated the New Jersey statute which requires the jury to say whether the verdict is for murder in the first or second degree. The trial judge remedied this oversight, and himself violated the law, by remarking in court that the jury had found the men "guilty of murder in the first degree." Subsequently he changed this form of words on the record.

The case has now been appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of New Jersey; the oral argument will be heard about May 16. If that court should rule against the defendants, the case will go to the US Supreme Court. In several cases in recent years, the highest court has reversed decisions in cases where defendants accused of serious crimes had suffered any impairment of "due process of law." In addition to the circumstances of the confessions, the Court might give attention to the allegation that several of the defendants were not warned, at the beginning of their interrogation, of their constitutional right to refuse to answer. They were notified of this right, if at all, many hours later and in an elliptical fashion. Even if it had been clear-cut, one

wonders just how much such a warning would mean to a young Negro cowering in a jail basement in the dead of night under bright lights and surrounded by white policemen.

How do the people of Trenton feel about what happened in their city? No one can be sure. The local press has given very little attention to the aspects of the case I have been discussing, though the *Trenton Times* did say that "the jury decision, without recommendation of mercy, seemed to have stunned the entire city." Outside Trenton, the newspapers, perhaps for a reason which I shall explain in a moment, have been singularly silent. The New York City dailies, indeed, have been so quiet about it that Don Hollenbeck, who reviews the press once a week for the Columbia Broadcasting System, felt moved to comment at length on their silence.

The possible reason which I just mentioned is that the Trenton case has been taken up in a big way by the Civil Rights Congress, which is usually identified as being close to the American Communist Party. The Congress has called this a Northern Scottsboro case, and has put out highly spectacular publicity matter regarding it. There is some evidence that many people in New Jersey have a feeling that anybody defended by the Communists is guilty *ipso facto*, or at the very least, that nobody else should soil his hands by interfering in a case the Communists have taken up, and on the same side.

But I am glad to say that not everybody shares this view. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, which is not a Communist or fellow-traveler organization, believes the conviction was an outrageous miscarriage of justice, and has submitted a brief *amicus curiae* (as a friend of the court) to the New Jersey Supreme Court. The American Civil Liberties Union, equally allergic to Communism, is doing the same thing. It is possible, I suggest, to hold the view that justice should be done even when the victims of injustice are supported by unpopular people. Or am I being quaint and old-fashioned?

HAROLD L. ICKES: Tidelands Oil

THERE IS a growing public interest in the proposal that this writer has been urging for some time, that the tidelands oil in California and elsewhere be used for the generally acknowledged need for federal aid to education. On April 14 the General Assembly of the state of Rhode Island adopted Resolution S 94 "urging Congress to support the Ickes plan for a federal educational trust to be administered in behalf of federal aid to state education." At the direction of the General Assembly, the Honorable Armand H. Cote, Secretary of State, has made me the proud possessor of a certified copy of this resolution.

It takes a long time for a new idea to incubate, but the action of the Rhode Island legislature is not the first sign that the proposal to use for education the national wealth we have in our tidelands oil has met with approval. We have known that the foundation stone of our form of government is the widely diffused education of our citizens. But, with taxes mounting in order to prepare for war and then to fight it, if it comes—to say nothing of healing the ravages of war and mending and pensioning its victims—the very states that contain the greater number of illiterates have been reluctant to tax themselves even for education. Of course it would be easy to slough off this obligation by saying that if the people of the state will not tax themselves for the maintenance of their schools, no obligation rests upon the federal government to make up the deficiency.

But would this be true? Should the nation condemn millions of its citizens to an inadequate education, or to none at all, because certain states are so poor, or think they are, that they cannot raise by taxation the money necessary for better teachers and more adequate school facilities? My own answer is in the negative. I believe that where there is a case of clear inability to meet by local taxes the educational needs of any state, the govern-

ment should make up the difference. After all, it is as true of the nation as it is of a machine that it is no stronger than the weakest of its parts. And no greater harm could threaten us than a creeping illiteracy, as the result of which we could not produce men for the professions, or to man machines, or take their place in time of war. No state should be allowed, by failing to tax itself to the fullest extent possible for educational purposes, to shirk a primary duty because it can look to the Federal Treasury to do for it what it will not do for itself. But it seems to me that, under a well-managed trusteeship, facts could not be hidden which would make it clear to what extent, if at all, a state needs outside help to make first-class citizens.

The resolution above referred to, by the General Assembly of Rhode Island, is not the only indication of an increasing interest in tidelands oil as a source of school revenue. As might have been expected, the aberrant Senator McCarran of Nevada has been pushing a bill to give title to the tidelands to the abutting states. Senator McCarran looks upon federal property as something to give away to favored and prosperous friends. However, it seems to be a foregone conclusion that this is one foray in the accomplishment of which Senator McCarran will not be able to gratify his penchant for giving property belonging to all of the people to a favored few. And then there is the bill introduced with the approval of the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Interior. Its effect would be to give good federal leases to the oil interests now holding bad state leases, without cost to them but at the expense of those applicants for tidelands leases who, in good faith, filed applications for leases in the belief that title to the tidelands was in the United States, just as the Supreme Court, in the California case, subsequently found it to be.

"Middle ground" in this interesting

controversy, upon the happy solution of which the future of our schools may depend, has been taken by Representative Case of South Dakota. It is the traditional "compromise" made by the husband when he yields to his wife's opposite point of view. Case has introduced a bill which would appear, on its surface, to be a compromise but which in fact is no compromise at all. He proposes to establish a national reserve of the submerged lands from one mile offshore to the end of United States jurisdiction, which apparently would be to the edge of the Continental Shelf. But, within this one-mile extension, the private companies could continue to extract federal oil, apparently without compensation to the government. With the shoreline and an extension of one mile beyond in the hands of the states—and therefore of the private oil interests—how could the US get at its oil beyond the proposed one-mile extension? I am assuming that Case, who is a reputable legislator, is proceeding in good faith in proposing such a solution, but I suspect that some "practical" oil man has bemused him.

Case's bill further provides that the national reserves be divided among the school districts of the country. Apparently he is unaware of the frauds that have been committed in connection with prior grants of public lands to school districts. Millions upon millions of dollars that might have been used for educational purposes have been wasted or misappropriated. It has already been suggested that Congress order a comprehensive investigation of what has happened in the past to federal grants for school purposes in the various states before considering a proposal that would probably mean more graft, more mismanagement and more blatant knavery.

The federal government itself should take over and manage, as trustees, for the benefit of all of the schools of the country, in proportion to their needs, this rich treasure of oil that, in the California case, the Supreme Court has said belongs to all of the people.

HAROLD L. ICKES

BOOKS IN REVIEW

"BRILLIANT, SINCERE, MALIGN"

by George Dangerfield

IN THE Jacksonian years, with all their cultural undernourishment, politics could put on a very good show, and something more than that. It transmitted many of the impulses which we now seek and obtain from art and from entertainment. Our early political conflicts were often parochial, ob-

JOHN C. CALHOUN: NULLIFIER, 1829-1839, by Charles C. Wiltse (Bobbs-Merrill, Inc.; \$6).

scure and dull, marked by imbecility and self-seeking; but they were also, at times and at their best, passionately creative. When Calhoun rose in the Senate to demolish an argument of Daniel Webster, John Randolph called out, "Take away that hat"—for a top-hat on a desk in front of him was in his way—"I want to see Webster die, muscle by muscle." Randolph was a dying man and probably an insane one; the words may have been apocryphal, but they were as profoundly of their time as they are too obviously not of ours. Today there are certain Senators whose slow death might, to an unprincipled imagination, be a rewarding spectacle; but it is not one which we should hope to encounter by attending a senatorial debate.

Charles C. Wiltse's biography of John Caldwell Calhoun—of which this is the second volume, with a third to come—is distinguished especially by the fact that the whole narrative is suffused with extra-political meaning, with the feeling that political conflicts, even local political conflicts, were often moving configurations of a cultural drama far larger than themselves. The period he covers, from 1829 to 1839, is the one in which Calhoun, emerging as champion of the slaveholders, first led his forces to the verge of rebellion, and then engaged in a series of desperate flirtations with

the Whigs and the Democrats, the great parties of the Right and the Left. It was also a period which marked the decline of the self-dedicated public servant (even Henry Clay saw himself in that light) and the rise of the political manager, the almost anonymous figure who sunk whatever local and ideological loyalties he may have possessed into a simple desire to get out the vote. It was a time of wrestling; not merely between great party leaders, but between types of men and kinds of allegiance; it was a dusty time and a book which covers it could be dry reading. I am glad to be able to report that Wiltse's book is not only learned, but also full of vitality and freshness.

I wish it were also possible to say that it is a book without faults, but faults there are: not indeed of scholarship or style, but of interpretation and emphasis. Those who have not read the first volume, or who have not bothered to reread it, might be forgiven for believing that Calhoun's first great battle for states' rights and minority interests was chiefly directed against the tariff of 1828, which was in turn chiefly responsible for the economic miseries of Calhoun's state of South Carolina. They might be lulled into forgetting that South Carolina had other and more permanent troubles: a one-crop system based on slavery, a pernicious factorage system, an inherent lack of resourcefulness which played into the hands of Northern banking and Northern shipping, and a laziness and inefficiency which were the necessary consequences of all these things. If this is unclear, it is because the author fails to emphasize it.

Calhoun was the contriver of the theory of nullification, or state interposition, a great constitutional hypothesis which maintained that the Union was a compact between sovereign states, that the general govern-

ment was merely the creature of these states, and that any one state could, by virtue of its inherent sovereignty, render inoperative within its borders any Act of Congress which it considered unconstitutional. Calhoun's arguments were brilliant, closely reasoned, and yet so lucid that anyone could understand them. But the history of this country clearly teaches us that, where constitutional arguments are concerned, we must look beyond the proximate to the remote cause. Granted that the tariff of 1828 was a tax upon the whole community, and especially upon the South, it must still be asked why Calhoun was prepared to go to such lengths in resisting it. Obviously because he was haunted by the fear that obsessed other Southerners, such as John Randolph and Nathaniel Macon, and which was never absent from the great debates of the 1820's and 1830's: the fear that if Congress could impose a tariff or dig a canal, it could also emancipate a slave.

I should say at once that elsewhere Wiltse exhibits Calhoun as first and foremost a defender of the slave interest, who was driven—by an extraordinary inner concatenation of courage, realism, particularism and dialectical genius—into becoming one of the great reactionaries of the early republic. Indeed, he states this explicitly, and in the last sentence of the book hammers the argument home. None the less, into the wide interstices of this argument he pushes a number of statements which seem to me either contradictory or dubious, or both.

For example, he says of Calhoun's belief that his paramount loyalty must be loyalty to the South: "Call it narrow localism if you like, but it is this same kind of localism which has always formed the core of resistance to the totalitarian state. . . . No government would ever be changed if men did not hold liberty, or faith, or property, or local ties more dear." All we have to ask ourselves is, what *kind* of property did Calhoun hold more dear?

At other times, Wiltse seems to be forcing himself, not indeed into a defense, but into a palliation of slavery.

"Generally," he writes of conditions throughout the South, "the slaves were well treated and loyal to their masters." This is the kind of statement, mild and deceptive, which we might expect from such a prejudiced historian as U. B. Phillips. As far as holding water is concerned, it is not so much a statement as a sieve. Or again, of Calhoun's asking that his runaway slave, Aleck, be given "30 lashes well laid on," Wiltse says, "Those who are revolted by corporal punishment will find that brutality in the treatment of labor was by no means peculiar to the master class of the South." This balancing of wage slavery against chattel slavery was a popular argument in Calhoun's time, but nowadays it can only be called a convenient way of begging an inconvenient question.

Even more disturbing is the biographer's interpretation of the character and motives of Andrew Jackson. "Andrew Jackson, deep down in his subconscious mind and sometimes consciously as well, did not think of himself as administering a government. He was leading an army, which he called a party and which he confused now and again with the 'people'." It is possible that Jacksonian mythology has recently been asked to absorb rather more radicalism than it is capable of holding. In this respect, Richard Hofstadter's chapter on Jackson in *The American Political Tradition*, and Charles Dorfman's recent article, "The Jackson Wage Earner Thesis," are examples of a reexamination of this mythology which are valuable, not only for what they have to say, but also on the sound principle that great national mythologies, unless they are constantly reexamined, tend to become great national fossils.

Wiltse's account of Jackson, however, is not a reexamination, but a regression. He does not even admit that Jackson was a man who used unconstitutional methods in order to defend the small entrepreneur against the encroachments of monopoly. To him, Andrew Jackson is nothing more than a *Napoleon des bois*, a despot, a "totalitarian." This is not a defect of scholarship, since the facts *could* be

made to bear this interpretation; but the interpretation, none the less, seems to me to be quite wrong-headed. It is a poor compliment to Calhoun if he has to be protected against his greatest enemy by such means.

In short, Wiltse is in the strange position of having at once to defend and to impeach a Calhoun whose character and intellect he admires, but whose objectives he is bound to deplore. Because of this inner contradiction, the book is interesting; and in spite of it, eminently worth reading. It should be read with caution, and thus read, it will not shake—I am sure that it was not meant to shake—a conviction that Calhoun was a man whose influence upon American history might be described as something brilliant, sincere and malign, which began with an hypothesis and ended with a holocaust.

George Dangerfield, whose most recent book was *Victoria's Heirs: The Education of a Prince*, is now working on a study of the Monroe and Adams administrations.

LAMENT FOR A NOVELIST

THE GOD-SEEKER, by Sinclair Lewis
(Random House; \$3.50).

EVEN THE MOST benign appraisal of the novels Sinclair Lewis has been turning out over the last fifteen years might give the impression of a man trying to cover his tracks. While it is true that his earlier work had a tendency to be almost rhythmically uneven, there was at least a pendulum movement and an element of surprise: if *Arrowsmith* was followed by *Mantrap*, *Dodsworth* came along to redeem *The Man Who Knew Coolidge*. Somewhere about 1934 or 1935, depending upon how you felt about *It Can't Happen Here*, the pendulum got stuck on the down stroke. The last six novels, including the one under review, have been monotonously bad, a soggy mishmash of sentimentality and half-digested social consciousness, through which one looks in vain for the robust rancor, the boisterous humor and the broad but often lethal satire that won Lewis the 1930 Nobel Prize. If these novels articulate what might

be generously called his period of affirmation, they also constitute a negation of the attitudes and abilities which gave him stature. In fact, it has become increasingly clear that Lewis' work began to decline rapidly as soon as he removed his thumb from his nose and placed it against his brow.

His new book, which is about religion (old-time), is a historical novel, in line with the author's recent interest in America's pioneer past. *The God-Seeker* is not only colossally bad; it is colossal, with Indians. It begins in 1830, in northern Massachusetts, with a little backwoods jackanapes named Aaron Gadd. Aaron's father is a psalm-singing curmudgeon who shoots dogs, pinches pennies and runs a station of the Underground Railroad for biblical rather than humanitarian reasons. At the age of eighteen, when he is by way of becoming a village tosspot, Aaron is converted at a revival meeting and determines to carry the bible to the indifferent Sioux. He also falls in love with a beautiful half-breed Indian maiden, Selene, whose father, Caesar Lanark, is a wealthy Indian trader in the Territory, an arrogant, sneering, cynical character apparently on loan to *The God-Seeker* from a Frank Yerby novel.

Aaron's religious zeal suffers a degree of deterioration during a few seasons with the missionaries, and he becomes deeply concerned with the Indian Problem. He is abetted in this by a preposterous young college-bred brave named Black Wolf (whose mother Lewis, in what I take to be a spirit of *blague*, has named Her Door) who is imbued with Red chauvinism and who spouts anachronistic social anthropology. When Selene returns to the reservation, Aaron defies her father, eludes the amorous clutches of a young female missionary, and sets off eastward with Selene across the snow. At the frontier settlement which was to become St. Paul the two are married and decide to stay and grow up with the town. When the book ends, in 1856, Aaron is a wealthy contractor in partnership with the chastened Lanark, a fearless liberal and

an honorary member of the St. Paul Building Workers' Fraternity and Union, which he has helped to found.

There is almost nothing of the old Lewis here, and certainly none of his best. The gusto is forced and hollow, applied, as it is, to alien themes. The satire has become in some instances sarcasm—and heavy sarcasm at that ("I simply cannot abide these ugly, awkward foreign names," said Mrs. Tryphosa Bopp Boogus, who came from Gahgosh Falls.")—and now that Lewis has laid his candid camera down, the characters appear like pictures cut from old bill-posters. There is nothing left but the old, clumsy, often lurid style, and the bones of the faults which we excused in the good books he wrote. *The God-Seeker* is an embarrassingly bad book by a reformed satirist. With it, I fear, Sinclair Lewis has joined the ranks of the less promising older writers.

JOHN WOODBURN

THE ENGLISH CRITIC

POETS AND STORY-TELLERS: A Book of Critical Essays, by David Cecil (The Macmillan Company; \$4).

AS A BRILLIANT lecturer Lord David Cecil is building up a following of enthusiastic Oxford undergraduates. As a stylist he has already won an international reputation. What does he have to say? It is as difficult to answer this question to an American's satisfaction as to explain to an Englishman why American critics do not take more pains with their writing. Of the distinguished critics in America during the last half-century, possibly only two—Paul Elmer More and Edmund Wilson—seem fully aware of the resources and beauty of the language they employ. Our scholars and critics bundle up literature in the palls of dullness or esoteric jargon.

The result is double: disgust and distrust on the part of the average man, worship on the part of initiates and acolytes. Such men as Van Wyck Brooks, Howard Mumford Jones, Bernard De Voto and J. Donald Adams have cried out in loud voices, though their cures often look worse than the disease. On the other hand, a historian

of recent criticism, Stanley Hyman, sets up in *The Armed Vision* a hierarchy which seems to assume that the more difficult and dense a criticism is, the better. R. W. Stallman, an anthologist, selects in his *Critiques and Essays in Criticism* only the newest approaches. Our best criticism is written by the *New Critics*, as if newness were a virtue, truth only recently discovered, and tradition today a second childhood and an inability to think for oneself.

On the other side of the water, the English manage to turn out essays of such tact, grace and well-bred lack of insistence that the American reading them feels he is wasting his time—and not improving his mind—by listening to delightful chat. May the difference be reduced to such simple terms as the persistent respect for tradition and liberal education abroad, the respect for German scholarship and scientific method in America? How can the English-speaking world develop writers who, like A. C. Bradley for England and John Livingston Lowes for the United States, can blend at least an adequate power of expression with a clearly developed proprietary thesis?

David Cecil's new volume illustrates excellently the English approach. He is the last of a long line of dons who lecture the English people from their berths at Oxford and Cambridge—Gray, Arnold for a time, Pater, Housman, Garrod, Leavis, C. S. Lewis. We have nothing like it in America. The title and the subtitle of his book tell us little. The prefatory note shows the collection to be composed of essays and lectures. The first two pieces reappraise John Webster and Shakespeare in his "Antony and Cleopatra" without being revolutionary in their thought. Of the remaining figures that are considered—Thomas Gray, Fanny Burney, Jane Austen, Turgenev, Benjamin Constant, Virginia Woolf and E. M. Forster—Cecil is least satisfying on Fanny Burney. Significantly, she is the only one of them who does not have a notable personal style or a sharp sense of form, or both. And she is the only

one who does not possess the discipline of subtlety. Cecil's subjects are carefully chosen as vehicles for his own interests.

Lord Cecil, then, imperceptibly impresses his tastes upon the reader in essays whose form, selection and style are delights in themselves. He believes that personal silhouettes can best be caught against a pattern, that passion and thought profit from control, that delicate touches educate the sensibilities more effectively than the great swash of paint. He is an artist in nuances and silvery suggestions.

Cecil realizes the difference between a critical essay and a conundrum. Far more successfully than any other contemporary critic has he disengaged the esthetic quality in his poets and storytellers. He brings his characters to trial before the triple bar of taste, sense and virtue. Passed through the filter of his fastidious taste, he shows for each of them (and in the process, for himself) mastery of form for one thing; not a detail, however casual-seeming, but contributes to the general effect. His words clothe the idea beautifully and aptly and in a garment that could only have been devised by

a person of the most refined taste and the highest culture. In him, an exquisite sensibility and an acute, inquisitive intelligence have been developed to the finest point of fastidious refinement. The result, mirrored in the transparent and gleaming element of Cecil's art, has the serene, special beauty of something done perfectly. The satisfaction comes partly from its formal perfection. Style in the work of most critics is of secondary importance. We read them for what they say, rather than how they say it. Cecil's style is a chief instrument in the pleasure his books give.

The above paragraph, describing what the author has accomplished in his book, is made up of ten critical observations drawn from the book itself (on Gray, Austen, Turgenev, Constant, Woolf and Forster), modified only so that they are turned upon Cecil. His subtle illuminations spring, therefore, from his sympathy with his subjects. No wonder that he dedicates the book to Max Beerbohm and quotes as epigraphs not only a passage from Pater but these words of William Hazlitt:

A genuine criticism should, as I take it, reflect the colours, the light and shade, the soul and body of a work . . . what the essence of the work is, what passion has been touched or how skilfully, what tone and movement the author's mind imparts to his subject or receives from it.

Hazlitt is not *vieux jeu* to Cecil because Hazlitt had the misfortune of writing over a hundred years ago, nor is Jane Austen because she does not write like Kafka or Joyce. Cecil turns us back into literature, not away from it. We could put up with more of this knack in America. But we will always remain impatient with it so long as we intolerantly and exclusively demand newness and progress in the humanities that we have always with us. We can never acquire it until we can understand and admire in critics like Cecil the quality which he so tactfully singles out in Jane Austen by simply quoting her sentences:

Here it was always the eighteenth century. Like everything English, she

thought, laying down her umbrella on the refectory table beside the china bowl, with dried rose leaves in it, the past seemed near, domestic, friendly.

DONALD A. STAUFFER

Donald A. Stauffer is the author of several books, the most recent of which are *The Nature of Poetry* and *The Saint and the Hunchback*. He is Chairman of the Department of English at Princeton University.

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
LAST OPERAS AND PLAYS, by Gertrude Stein. Edited, and with an Introduction, by Carl Van Vechten (Rinehart and Company; \$5).

THE FINAL and posthumous sound of the title suggests the nature of this book—literary "remains," scraps left over. Its most conspicuous value is its completeness, but at least four among these nineteen pieces stimulate a livelier curiosity: "Four Saints in Three Acts," "Doctor Faustus Lights the Lights," "Yes Is for a Very Young Man" and "The Mother of Us All."

What interest has the general reader in these pieces? Very little, and that is nobody's fault. This is not chamber literature, and its value for the stage the general reader cannot judge. What, for example, can he make of opera librettos separated from their music? It is axiomatic among composers that the very qualities that give a libretto independent (literary) interest defeat the purposes of opera. These words are from "The Mother of Us All": "The Vote. Women have the vote. They have it each and every one, it is glorious glorious glorious." Virgil Thomson, who wrote the score, may have interesting things to say about how these words lend themselves to music. As written, they don't lend themselves to other comment.

The reader may idly wonder, all the same, how these plays could be produced on an actual stage. The script may go: Act III; Act IV; Part XXXVII; Act II—these divisions often marking off only a single sentence, or phrase, or word. Carl Van Vechten quotes Thornton Wilder's guess that "this is her satirical jab at pedantry and formalism in general, her way of saying, 'Don't fence me in!'" Perhaps that's it. These pieces,

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as printed, probably do not pretend to a theatrically practicable form. Maurice Grosser, who supplied scenarios for "Four Saints in Three Acts" and "The Mother of Us All," "told [Van Vechten] that any number of other plots or arrangements of the characters would be equally valid." Which at least suggests the difficulty of committing oneself to more than curiosity.

Miss Stein's most ingratiating reputation has been for good common sense. And she has, indeed, a rare talent for seeing straight into traditional values and customs and then discharging her insight as the monolithic utterances of a homespun sibyl. But in this book, when she does deliver straight from the horse's mouth, the common sense strikes as commonplace, as trite as it is true. "The Germans are obedient and obedient people must sooner or later follow a bad leader, that is what the Germans do." Perfectly prosaic observations like that are burdened with embarrassing significance in the frequent context of meaningless or suggestive "words of one syllable."

Suggestive, one must rather say, because any word merely flung down on paper can boast a meaning of sorts. Perhaps it is this trustworthy habit of words to find a meaning for themselves that Miss Stein had in mind when "she frequently remarked that what an author conceived and what the public would make of this conception were two distinct phenomena." This may appear the extreme of nonchalance for one who worked in a medium of communication, but Van Vechten recalls that "In *The Making of Americans*, she confessed, 'I write for myself and strangers,' and later, in conversation, withdrew the strangers."

Much of her later writing reads like coterie talk—full of private jokes, private allusions, private names. One can appreciate this exclusiveness; there are obvious advantages in writing manuscripts to hand round among cultivated and sympathetic friends. But privacy is a delicate thing, requiring infinite tact. The temptation in privacy, for an artist, is to withdraw from the public view and perform for the keyhole.

JOHN FARRELLY

ON THE AIR: Daytime Prodigy

IN POLITE broadcasting circles, no one speaks of soap opera. A euphemism must be found if one is to remain on drinking terms with the enthusiasts for that art form. A favored term is "daytime serial."

Mutual is now carrying a new program five days a week from 11:30 to noon, and each day's show is one chapter of a continuing story. But that's where all resemblance ends, not only to other "daytime serials" but to anything else on the air. The author, Sandra Michael, calls her work a "radio novel." Coming from anyone else writing for radio, that would seem presumptuous. She makes it fit.

By all means, take time out some

morning to listen to "Against the Storm." If past performance and the first seven or eight broadcasts of the present series are reliable indications, you'll find "Against the Storm" bucking a lot of fixed ideas about what can or cannot be accomplished by radio.

"Against the Storm" blazes no path when it is placed on the campus of a university, with a professor and his pretty daughter as the principals. A famous psychiatrist, Louis Berg, discussing "Storm's" earlier run on a coast-to-coast network in 1942, noted that it employs the usual radio-serial devices: "Identification, autism, projection." But he pointed out the difference between Miss Michael's intent

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THE Big Secret

by MERLE COLBY



THE VIKING PRESS

and that of her colleagues on the daytime air. She uses her skill to convince the listener "that he has a moral obligation never to yield in the battle against . . . evil forces." She makes that effort by adding "humor, pathos, tolerance, burning anger against injustice, tenderness . . . basic understanding of human nature." Many radio writers try to use at least some of these ingredients. Miss Michael is notable because she succeeds.

Carl Sandburg spoke more simply of Miss Michael more recently, but also in highest praise. She deserved the applause when "Storm" was on the air (on NBC) from 1940 to 1945. I hope she earns it again, now that she's back, on Mutual.

There are two distinct, but dovetailed, story lines on the program. Of course, there must be romance, but there isn't anything phony about it. The romantic element is provided by Siri Allen, daughter of a professor at Harper University, who is coveted by a young atomic scientist she has known all her life. But Siri is concerned with more than suitors, being involved in the battle centering on her father. The university board of trustees, using the excuse that he has reached the advanced age of 65, is allowing Allen's contract to lapse. A faculty friend of the professor is organizing colleagues and students to protest against the board's action. The president of the university admits that the real reason for insistence on Allen's retirement is that he has "dangerous" ideas.

Some of those ideas were detailed in a narration Quentin Reynolds made for a preview broadcast advertising the program. Back in the twenties, Allen had made "an unpatriotic, unholy noise" about using a million dollars for a new stadium rather than for scholarships and a bigger teaching staff. Allen had also been against Hitler in the early thirties, and had insisted more recently that the university has no right to ask a prospective student "what church he goes to or how his parents vote."

For five days a week, a half-hour each day, Allen's fight against reac-

tion, and his daughter's heartaches, will occupy Mutual's air. The combination is fair enough, as long as Siri doesn't get too maudlin; and there is reason to expect she'll be acceptable. In "Storm's" earlier life, the action and story line were geared into hard-hitting anti-fascism. The present protagonist represents, as the show has already stated flatly, the postwar "progressive." I think Miss Michael is entitled to some romantic embroidery if it helps keep the show on the air.

One earlier feat which I hope Miss Michael repeats is the stunt of writing in an occasional fat part for some unusual guest, often a poet. Already on the new program, one of her characters has been caught spouting Bulwer-Lytton. She once brought poetry by Edgar Lee Masters and by John Masefield to the air—read each time by the respective author. Once she wrote in a part for President Roosevelt. He was to go on in December, reading Heywood Broun's famous Christmas column. That was in 1941, and Pearl Harbor wrecked the plan for a "live"

appearance by the President. Roosevelt therefore recorded his reading, but NBC had a rule then against using transcriptions on its de-luxe air.

Mutual, rightfully proud of acquiring Miss Michael's new radio novel, will probably be careful with its censorship. I doubt that it will repeat NBC's stuffiness when it wouldn't allow a fictional journalist to say that the American Newspaper Guild had given him and his colleagues a sense of security and dignity. That is the kind of thing that is apt to crop up on a Michael script. I don't blame either the network or the sponsors (Philip Morris cigarettes) for keeping their eyes sharp and their ears open. But I rather suspect that the listeners will also watch this Lillian Hellman of the air.

Recommended listening: Sunday, May 22, 10 to 11 p.m., the CBS Documentary Unit will produce a study of American politics, "The People's Choice." Script is by Peter Lyon.

SAUL CARSON

THEATRE: Paris Season, No. 2

JEAN-LOUIS BARRAULT operates the most ambitious theatrical company in Paris. His great prestige with both the younger generation of theatregoers and the more conservative may be explained, in part, by the variety of his repertory. It includes such experimental work as Gide's adaptation of Kafka's *The Trial* (no longer current), a prewar bedroom farce, a poetic tragedy by Claudel and, most important—aside from his "Hamlet," of which I shall speak in my next article—lively and tasteful performances of the eighteenth-century "tearful comedies" of Marivaux and, above all, Molière's low comedy, "Les Fourberies de Scapin," directed by Louis Jouvet.

Barrault, admired in America for his performance as the clown in "Les Enfants du Paradis," is an extremely limited actor. He cannot play realistic parts. His treatment of verse is in-

ferior. He is essentially a pantomimist with a body that seems to have no weight or tension at all. As Scapin he bounces and flies through the air like a magically pliant instrument whose resemblance to a man is tangential.

Barrault's lightness and Jouvet's use of it establish the style for "Scapin." The dryness of French observation is refined in this instance into something which is at once "inhuman" and tonic, as if a mathematical equation were endowed with wit and set dancing.

Pierre Fresnay is now appearing in a somewhat cheap but nevertheless shrewd comedy called "Les Oeufs de l'Autruche" ("The Ostrich's Eggs") about a loud-mouthed bourgeois who discovers that his older son is a homosexual and his younger son a "kept" boy. If this play could conceivably be done on Broadway, we should be

obliged to emphasize its daring. Its success in Paris is largely due to its amusing treatment of a subject that shocks only its central character.

Fresnay is priceless as the raucous "ostrich." To hear his vulgar vociferations and to observe his cocky stance, his red-faced commonness, his bluff superciliousness, his stupidly crafty eyes, his gruff and idiotic sentimentality is to marvel how this actor could have played the saintly Monsieur Vincent or the aristocratic officer of "Grand Illusion." No American star today is given the opportunity to be so versatile. To emphasize this versatility and to give his wife, Yvonne Printemps, a chance to sing some songs, Fresnay also appears as an impossible ornamental Marcel Proust in a silly "impromptu" about the great writer and "a woman of the people" by Curzio Malaparte.

"*Ardele*," or "The Daisy," is a well-written play by Jean Anouilh, the author of the "Antigone" Katharine Cornell did three years ago. Anouilh is perhaps the most gifted of the younger French playwrights, though not necessarily the most important. "Ardele" might be called a tragic farce in which the loveless and hectic promiscuity romanticized by the fashionable French dramatists and novelists before 1914 is seen through the disenchanted eye of the 1949 Parisian. Everybody in the play wallows in a feverish absurdity consisting of rancid sex adventures covered by a traditional "correctness." The only people sincerely in love are two hunchbacks who never appear but whose suicide ends the play. "Ardele" is rather crudely acted and directed. Its production style of grimacing hilarity is, however, eminently right, though it might prove difficult for even a better company of American actors to capture.

Very few American playwrights could match Anouilh's brilliant combination of harsh comment and bold farce. Yet for all his deftness and maturity, there is something about his play that strikes one as moldy and, in a sense, uncreative. Even when the younger American playwrights appear

naïve, their best work is healthier than such a play as Anouilh's, because the Americans' work represents a fresh start. The Frenchman is still making art out of once tender memories toward which he now feels only bitterness. But hate can be as sentimental and passive as nostalgia.

Last season's success, Sartre's "Les Mains Sales," remains the most representative of recent plays. Whatever one thinks of it in a final accounting, it is truly a play of today, one whose very ambiguities constitute part of its interest. "My story," says the play's protagonist, "is a container to which there are many keys." And that is what makes the play deserve something more than a snap judgment. What the New York production did was to eliminate all its complexities, which was to destroy its value.

In the Paris production one is struck by the almost fraternal affinity Sartre feels for his confused hero and the veneration he betrays toward his unswerving Communist antagonist. The young intellectual with whom Sartre identifies himself is portrayed as someone who barely escapes the ridiculous; the Communist about whom Sartre tries to be wholly dispassionate seems to inspire in him nothing but admiration. Almost regretfully Sartre acknowledges himself closer to the hysterical idealist than to the integrated materialist. In this he reflects the majority of France's middle-class intelligentsia.

Because "Les Mains Sales" is not produced as a vehicle for a star, its proportions are correctly maintained. The Communist is played not Byronically, as Boyer did, but as a steel-hard worker with the voice, body, clothes and hands, the dense vigor of a proletarian leader. André Luguet is the actor who plays the part in Paris and I supposed as I watched him that he had been type-cast, only to learn that up to the present Luguet has been chiefly associated with urbane light comedies. The rest of the cast is mediocre. A point to be noted, however, is that the direction, which is rough but far more humorous and active than

was the case in New York, follows the sense of the play.


It is about time that Americans who do French plays show sufficient confidence in their material to translate them instead of making conceited and pointless adaptations. Though this production of "Les Mains Sales" at the Théâtre Antoine would be considered too unfinished to open in New York, it does give us Sartre, and not a deluxe edition with most of the matter deleted. I had a feeling in Paris that I was seeing "Les Mains Sales" for the first time.

HAROLD CLURMAN

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MOVIES: Good Intention

A FILM THAT MAKES a frontal attack on the one prejudice in this country that enjoys official respectability—discrimination against the Negro—reflects credit on the men responsible for it. In the case of "Home of the Brave," the challenge to the group that defends Jim Crow as a manifestation of natural law was deliberate: the original Arthur Laurents play was a study of anti-Semitism. "Home of the Brave" is a Screen Plays Corporation picture, released through United Artists. It was produced by Stanley Kramer, directed by Mark Robson.

But having complimented these men on the impulse that set them to their work, one is left with the less agreeable job of evaluating what they have done. "Home of the Brave" is a sensational, really a hysterical, production. It does not assume that men are equal, it does not even argue that they are; it screams equality.

The picture sets five American soldiers, one a Negro, one a "nigger hater," on a Jap-infested jungle island and requires them to perform an intricate job of cartography under constant threat of death. It introduces a situation in which one man is horribly tortured while the others are forced to listen to his agony; it strains probability by having the dying man crawl back to the arms of his lifelong friend (the Negro); it invites tears by letting another of the group recite tender, intimate poetry written by his wife. It then narrates this story, not directly, but through a series of flashbacks woven into scenes in which the Negro, a victim of extreme battle shock, writhes and moans through the harrowing (and mysterious) therapy of narcosynthesis.

There is every probability that prejudice cannot be overcome by logic; certainly it cannot be dissipated by an appeal to hot emotion. "Home of the Brave" will convert no one; in some observers, it could have the effect of confirming prejudice. Despite its un-

derlined and repeated insistence on the lack of difference between Negroes and whites, what it shows us is one man on the verge of insanity, one man sweating and weeping through relentless close-ups. He is the Negro. Of course, the logic of the picture makes it perfectly apparent why this should be so, but the producers of "Home of the Brave" have used every device from foreboding music to the choked tenderness of inarticulate men, not to awaken the mind, but to arouse the blood.

Divorced from its message, "Home of the Brave" is an uneven war film. The small cast of seven is well selected, well directed; in their idle moments they are excellent representations of the American male. But the island sequences are ludicrously unconvincing. The mission goes about its work, bickering, laughing, smoking, breaking out into fist fights, as though the men thought themselves still on maneuvers in some Louisiana swamp. And their sentimental feeling for one another is a queasy embarrassment to the observer.

Yet "Home of the Brave" is an important picture. It has cast a Negro as the tragic hero, it has defied the timidities of the picture industry and made a film on probably the most sensitive subject in American life. Perhaps now it will some day be possible for a Negro to appear in a serious role without anyone crying, "Look, look." Then we shall begin to forget we are tolerant and start assuming we are brothers.

When the dust of as complicated and melodramatic a plot as the season can boast has settled a bit, it can be seen that "Flamingo Road" is a considerably better than average picture. This is so because of the plausible acting of Joan Crawford and Zachary Scott, because of a skillful evocation of small-town America and because its political skulduggery (firearms and heroics aside) is not unlike what

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It would take as long to unravel the story of "Flamingo Road" as it does to see the picture, but Miss Crawford plays a stranded carnival girl, Scott is a weakling son of the local aristocracy and Sydney Greenstreet (chuckling like anything) is the sheriff and political tyrant who proposes to terrorize Scott into the Governor's mansion. Gladys George is present as a strong-minded roadhouse madam and David Brian as a conniver who can't quite swallow the obese Greenstreet. Among them they play the dickens with a lot of well-laid plans.

"Flamingo Road" is off the conveyor belt, but it is one of the more attractive machine products.

The reunion of Fred Astaire and Ginger Rogers in "The Barkleys of Broadway" is a gala but somewhat melancholy occasion. Perhaps "Top Hat" and "The Gay Divorcée" were not as extravagantly good as we remember; perhaps Astaire and Rogers seem, if not older, at least wearier. They are helped none by a peculiarly disagreeable plot (Miss Rogers is convinced by a lavender French playwright that she has the Bernhardt touch and Astaire must, since he loves her so much, coach her incognito by telephone). It is too bad, also, that the one excellent production number in the picture, "Shoes with Wings On," is an Astaire solo. The music is just something to dance to, except for a revival of George and Ira Gershwin's "They Can't Take That Away from Me." Oscar Levant plays himself with the charming ease of long familiarity. His direct and vigorous approach to a piano is a sight to make Jimmy Durante wonder.

But if Astaire and Rogers are off form in "The Barkleys," they are still very good at their trade, and the season is not likely to produce a better screen musical.

Anyone planning to make a movie out of Gene Fowler's biography of Jimmy Walker might inquire whether Astaire would play the lead.

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***HOW STRONG IS
SOVIET RUSSIA?***

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Maurice Hindus, Alex Inkeles, Joseph P. Lash, Richard E.
Lauterbach, Robert Magidoff, Harry Schwartz, Solomon M.
Schwarz, E. J. Simmons, Michael Straight, Bertram Wolfe**

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AND GOVERNMENT • THE ATTACK ON THE WEST • SOVIET
IDEOLOGY • THE SIGNIFICANCE OF TITOISM**

NEW REPUBLIC, MAY 16, 1949, IN TWO PARTS: PART TWO

Report on the second **ROUND TABLE CONFERENCE** sponsored
by the Union for Democratic Action Education Fund, in
cooperation with the *New Republic*, at the Columbia Faculty
Club, New York City, April 2 and 3, 1949

PARTICIPANTS*

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JOSEPH P. LASH, Secretary of Round Table and Editor of its proceedings.

* All conferees were present as individuals, not as representatives of institutions or organizations.

HOW STRONG IS SOVIET RUSSIA?

INTRODUCTION

THE FOLLOWING REPORT of a round-table discussion of Soviet strength and weakness in which a group of Moscow correspondents, scholars and experts participated, at the invitation of the *New Republic* and the Union for Democratic Action, encompasses within 32 pages an extraordinary amount of revealing information about the sources of Soviet behavior.

Perhaps the most significant conclusion is that conditions of life within the USSR are not so difficult as to produce a crisis of regime, but difficult enough to make highly improbable any international move that might lead to war. This conclusion is all the more impressive because of the wide divergence of viewpoints represented at the symposium.

In summary here is how the balance sheet drawn up at the round table adds up: The Soviet Union will achieve the economic goals outlined in the postwar Five-Year Plan, the fourth such project; nevertheless, its total productive capacity will still be far below that of the United States.

Living standards have begun to improve since the end of the war; but they have not regained the levels reached within the USSR in 1928, and cannot even be compared with those in Western Europe.

This is the weakest element in the Soviet structure and many of our experts viewed the Soviet government's carefully cultivated campaign of hostility to the West as designed in large measure to keep the Soviet citizen from realizing how badly off he is.

Superimposed on an economy of scarcity in the USSR is an elaborate incentive system introduced to stimulate greater productivity. This system depends on an enormous differentiation in wages. It is an element of strength so long as wages and salaries remain roughly proportionate to importance of function and do not diminish equality of opportunity. It is at the same time a constant peril to the regime because equalitarianism is deeply rooted in Marxist philosophy.

The Soviet government and the Communist Party emerged from the war strengthened in authority and prestige. The party membership, however, has under-

gone a tremendous turnover and as a result is politically less experienced and ideologically less mature than it was before the purges and the war. The government seems to be suffering from a serious lack of trained administrators.

There is no sign that the authority of the Communist Party is challenged by any opposition, but neither is there any relaxation in the dictatorial repressive character of the regime. There was general agreement that the armed forces remain subordinate to the civil authorities, but there was a sharp divergence of opinion over whether the secret police are subordinate to or more powerful than the party.

The round table discussed the extent to which the ideas of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism have become a settled part of the outlook of the average Soviet citizen. The appeal to Russian nationalism during the war, the revival of religion, the postwar emphasis on ideological orthodoxy, indicate that 25 years of Soviet education have not been completely effective in reshaping the character and viewpoint of the Soviet people. It is equally clear, however, that such concepts as the public ownership of the means of production and distribution have become an unshakable part of Soviet thinking, particularly of the Soviet intelligentsia and the members of the Communist Party. Even if these groups should become disaffected with the regime, the free-enterprise philosophy of the West would have little attraction for them.

It was felt that in this respect Titoism is of the greatest significance because it is a movement of dissidence that operates within the general framework of Communist principles, and, therefore, constitutes a much more serious challenge to the hegemony of the Politburo than any coming from the West.

It was on the basis of this sober evaluation of Soviet strength and weakness that opinion at the round table was unanimous that the Soviet leadership would not risk war, although it would continue to take advantage of every organic weakness in the non-Communist world to expand Soviet power and empire.

What does all this mean for United States policy?

If Soviet expansionism is fundamentally a political and economic challenge rather than a military one, the most important counter-measures are those which redress the inequities and heal the divisions which Soviet Communism seeks to exploit. Defensive measures are necessary to curb Soviet expansionism, but defensive measures that involve recognition of Franco Spain, the restoration to power of the German

industrialists and tolerance of Dutch imperialism, may bring us the support of governments, but will lose us the support of peoples.

Progressive democracy has nothing to fear from Soviet Communism. A reactionary crusade against the Soviet Union, however, even armed with the atomic bomb, might suffer the same fate as the Nationalist government of China.

I. SUCCESS OF THE FOURTH FIVE-YEAR PLAN

FUNDAMENTAL to any assessment of Russian strength and weakness was an evaluation of the progress of Soviet economic recovery. Dr. Abram Bergson, at Chairman Straight's invitation, led off the discussion. Two different predictions had been made concerning the prospects of Russian reconstruction, he stated.

MR. BERGSON. One viewpoint has circulated primarily outside of Russia, among many foreign commentators. This is that as a result of the war destruction, the Russians very likely would be prostrate for a generation or so. This viewpoint has emphasized both the magnitude of Russian war damage and the length of time required to make it good. The implication has also been, obviously, that the Russians are weak, and that this weakness is a factor to take into account in thinking of Russian behavior generally.

Now, there is another viewpoint that has circulated inside of Russia, and which finds expression in the fourth Five-Year Plan that was promulgated in March, 1946. According to this viewpoint, a much more optimistic forecast is made about the progress of reconstruction. According to the fourth Five-Year Plan, economic activity in Russia generally in 1950—at the end of the Plan—is to be well above that before the war. It is envisaged, for example, that the total production of all goods and services in 1950 will considerably exceed that of 1940. The total amount of fixed capital is to be somewhat above 1940.

This does not mean that the Russians had in mind to make good every bit of war damage by 1950. Undoubtedly, in 1950, the geographic distribution of capital in industry will be different from what it was in 1940, so that the total amount of capital and production in the eastern regions will be above—well above—the prewar level; at the same time there will still be some damage to make good in the west. For the economy as a whole, they envisage that economic activity generally in 1950 will be well above the prewar level.

Now, what about the facts on this? As far as I have been able to ascertain them, these facts completely dis-

credit the foreign commentators' viewpoint, the non-Soviet forecast on this matter, and while they do not fully corroborate the Soviet forecast, it seems that the truth, as revealed by the progress to date, is much nearer the Soviet forecast than the foreign view.

As far as I can judge from the available facts on production, the total national production of the Soviet Union—the total production of all goods and services—currently is still below the prewar level, but far above that at the end of the war; and unless there is some unforeseen development, such as, for example, a need to shift much more resources into armaments than are now being devoted to that purpose, my impression is that the Russians, by 1950, will definitely be operating above the 1940 level, taking their economy as a whole.

Of course, much interest attaches to the question as to the development in different sectors, and here I will just make a few general remarks. The main emphasis unquestionably is on heavy industry, but the Russians are making rather rapid progress in restoring living standards, which fell to fantastically low levels during the war. My own judgment is that living standards declined by about two-fifths during the war. Much progress has been made since toward regaining the prewar level.

Now, this might seem to add up to a notion that economically what we have to think of is strength rather than weakness as a factor in Soviet behavior. But I don't want to be put in the position of emphasizing Russian strength on the basis of these few remarks. We obviously have to bear in mind a variety of other factors besides those I have mentioned in order to evaluate the Soviet economic position, and account must be taken also of the relation between the Soviet economic position and that of the United States.

Even if the Russians do fulfill their fourth Five-Year Plan, their production generally, and even in heavy industries, will be far below that of the United States. That has to be taken into account, as well as their geographic position, developments in Eastern Europe, developments in Asia.

Well, I think I have said enough to break the ice.

Harry Schwartz stated that the evidence published

by Soviet authorities suggested that in terms of gross industrial output, in the invaded areas, about two-thirds of prewar output had been achieved in 1948.

MR. HARRY SCHWARTZ. Have the Soviets surpassed for the whole economy prewar levels of industrial production and productivity? The Soviet government itself claims, for the three-year period as a whole, 1946-48, the industrial-output plan has been surpassed slightly, and that 1948 gross industrial output was 18 percent above 1940 production.

It also claims that productivity of industrial labor in 1948 exceeded the prewar level. My opinion is that the postwar gains are exaggerated. The 1926-27 ruble measurements of industrial output inevitably inflate the indexes of production and productivity. Productivity varies widely in different plants, and the variation rather than the average is perhaps the significant thing for many problems.

As compared with the United States, certainly, their average industrial productivity is substantially below. There are only a very few Soviet plants and industries which approach the American level.

The movement for "accumulation" above planned goals and "profitability" of enterprises is evidence of economic success; that is, they have gone far enough in their recovery so that they are able to face the problem of using their resources most efficiently and squeezing the last bit of output out of them. They are now emphasizing efficiency very much.

CHAIRMAN STRAIGHT. Would you like to comment on these points, Mr. Schwarz?

MR. SOLOMON SCHWARTZ. The Five-Year Plan, generally, as it is conceived, can be attained. The plan is relatively moderate in its industrial goals. If you take the most important figures and compare them with the goals in the third Five-Year Plan, 1942, or in the second Five-Year Plan, 1937, you are astonished that the figures are often so moderate, in spite of the fact that we now have a much larger Soviet Union, not only in area but—much more important—in population, which has increased by approximately 14 percent.

For the year 1950, the production of pig iron, as scheduled in this fourth Five-Year Plan, is 19.5 million tons, and in the third Five-Year plan, 1942, it was 22. For steel, it is now 25.4, and for 1942 it was 28; for raw iron it is 17.8, and then it was 21.4. The same is characteristic of many important commodities. For oil the plan figure for 1950 is 35.4 million tons, lower not only than for 1942—48.5 million tons—but even lower than for 1937, the end of the second Five-Year Plan: 44.3. Cotton textiles—4.7 billion meters for 1950 against 4.9 billion meters for 1942 and 5.1 billion meters for 1937. Sugar—2.4 million tons for 1950 against 3.5 million tons for 1942 and 2.6 million tons even for 1932-33, the end of the first Five-

Year Plan. The 1950 plan figures are relatively modest.

MR. BERGSON. I am wondering about the use of the word "moderate." They lost a lot during the war. They didn't fulfill the third Five-Year Plan, so it is not a case of their going on from that plan to the fourth. They moved backward during the war.

MR. SCHWARTZ. Generally, the aims, the goals for the the fourth Five-Year Plan, are relatively modest and can be, as a whole, attained. The plan will, in the industrial part, be fulfilled, except for some important things like electric power. These will not be fulfilled.

But even if the plan for the year 1960, as Stalin spoke of it in 1946, were to be attained, it still cannot be compared with American figures of production. The basis of Russian strength is not in Russian industry. The basis of Russian strength is the geographical position of Russia and its manpower. Russia has a relatively young population. Over 200 million people now live in Russia, and there are relatively few old people. This is of the greatest importance if you compare the two countries.

Progress within Industries

CHAIRMAN STRAIGHT suggested the group address itself to whether some sectors of the fourth Five-Year Plan were going better than others.

MR. BERGSON. These are estimates based on percentages and all the scattered information that is available. Steel production in 1948, 17 million tons, as compared with 18 million in 1940; electric-power production in 1948, 63 billion kilowatt-hours as compared with 48 in 1940; coal, just about the same in 1948 as it was in 1940, when it was 166 million tons.

MR. SCHWARTZ. I think it is higher than that.

MR. BERGSON. It may be higher. Cement, seven million tons as compared with six million tons in 1940.

The general picture you get in the case of heavy industry is that production is either about at the 1940 level or above it. Electric power is the outstanding case where it is well above, and I suspect in many items of machinery it is above.

MR. SCHWARTZ. In the case of tractors, they announced that they are supplying agriculture this year with two or three times the number of tractors the farms got in 1940, but the peak of tractor output was not reached in 1940. It was reached two or three years earlier, after which they converted many of the tractor factories to tanks, so that the 1940 comparison there would be misleading.

MR. BERGSON. I'd like to add to what was said

earlier about reconstruction. While the Russians are trying to restore the economy of the invaded areas, they are carrying out very large investments in the non-occupied areas of the Urals and Siberia. Furthermore, these areas were built up during the war. It is quite clear that a crucial factor in Russia's survival during the war, in addition to lend-lease, was the tremendous expansion of heavy industry in the Urals and Siberia. When the Russians came out of the war, heavy industry in those regions was already far above the prewar level. You have a complex situation of the decline in output in the invaded areas, and expansion in the never occupied areas, which is now continuing, so the total picture is much more favorable from their point of view than what you get if you just look at the progress of reconstruction in the invaded areas alone.

This development in the east during the war is most important. I suspect that the pessimistic foreign view of Soviet reconstruction prospects is to a great extent based on the neglect of this development in the east. It is clear that the expansion of heavy industry there during the war is a crucial factor permitting the Russians to build up and reconstruct the invaded areas now.

MR. ROBERT MAGIDOFF. I'd like to point out that these additional constructions are going on not only in the far east but also in the far north. They have, during the war, completed, in the Pechora Basin, with the help of prison labor, a railway 1,200 miles long, and coal mines producing 12 million tons of coal a year. Also 100 miles northeast of Leningrad, they are planning to construct a steel works to supply the entire industrial area of Leningrad, Moscow and Gorki. The strategic position of this new future giant of the Soviet steel industry is extremely significant.

MR. ALEX INKELES. By moving a considerable portion of their industry eastward, the Soviets put themselves into a much better position in terms of their transportation problem. It lessens the distance between mineral resources and the location of industry. This would influence their over-all strength.

At the same time, however, the movement of industry involves certain serious elements of weakness, inasmuch as it puts the Russians in a position, in terms of population, which is rather on the negative side. The eastern areas are somewhat distant from their best population in terms of productive capacity. This would involve some strain on the Soviet system, such as moving population eastward to take part in the replacement of industry, and training people of new qualified cadres. Furthermore, production in these areas may be somewhat negatively affected because the people who are moved will live under difficult conditions for some time, more so than people living in the industrial western parts of the USSR.

MR. MAGIDOFF. To offset this negative thing, they

inaugurated a complex system of incentives to encourage people to settle in the outlying areas. And I might add that many people who had evacuated, and the equipment, almost all of it, were not sent back to the West after the war. The incentives for new settlers mean two or three times as high monthly wages. They receive grants, loans and lumber for the building of homes. Girls are encouraged to settle in the far north and far east. There was a movement at one time which brought about 100,000 girls to these distant areas, and most of the girls have got married and settled down.

Agricultural Recovery

CHAIRMAN STRAIGHT. Mr. Hindus, I wonder if you would develop, from the standpoint of internal stability, what you would consider to be the total outlook today in terms of agricultural production.

MR. MAURICE HINDUS. I haven't been in Russia since 1945, and it is difficult to make a specific statement on the subject. But, basing my opinion on observations before the war and during the war, in areas that have been reconquered, I should say that first, Russians have gained a formula for solving agricultural problems which, while not comparable with methods of production in this country, represents for Russia a much more highly advanced technique than it had had in the old days or in the pre-Five-Year-Plan years, and that technique was put to use in agricultural recovery.

The Russians now have an astonishing amount of knowledge of scientific agriculture, rotation of crops, fertilizing, selection of livestock. They have probably done more than any other country in the use of artificial insemination of livestock, particularly sheep. The experience that the Russians have gained in modern agriculture, and the kind of organization they have perfected, would enable them, as far as field crops are concerned, to make real progress very quickly.

As far as livestock is concerned, the situation is more dismal. You can plow an acre of land, take good care of it, and you will get a good crop, but it takes about three or four years to raise a good cow, and about the same period of time to raise a good horse. As far as field crops are concerned, I think the recovery is certain to be rapid. As far as livestock is concerned, it certainly is going to be slow. I will make only one reservation: I do not believe they are manufacturing as many tractors now as they did before the war, although during the war years, some Russian engineers told me they were building several combine factories and a large tractor factory in Siberia. Evidently Siberia has a great deal of industry devoted to the manufacture of agricultural machinery.

MR. LOUIS FISCHER. What about manpower? Is it adequate?

MR. HINDUS. As far as manpower in farming is concerned, it is not so important. During the war years, I went to villages where you hardly saw young men at all. The old men couldn't do heavy work, but the women had really acquired the knack of running agricultural machines, and were doing extremely well. So I do not feel that the men in agriculture are so important.

MR. SCHWARTZ. They are transferring manpower from agriculture to industry right now.

MR. HINDUS. They are. School children do a lot of agricultural work. It is astonishing how 15 and 16-year-old girls can run tractors and combines.

MR. JOSEPH BARNES. Russian agriculture has always been overmanned, hasn't it?

MR. HINDUS. Yes.

MR. SCHWARTZ. Recent reports for a good many areas suggest that perhaps the sown area is 80 percent or 90 percent of prewar, or was, at least, last year. The yields are still, in most cases, below the prewar level, so that perhaps agricultural output is around 60, 70 or 75 percent of prewar. Again, the roughness of the figure is emphasized.

MR. HINDUS. The statement given in a recent issue of *Bolshevik*, which I have with me, specifically claims that the yield per acre now is larger than in 1940.

MR. SCHWARTZ. My statement regarding per-acre yield was not for the Soviet Union as a whole, but for the area occupied during the war, the Ukraine and western Russia. Many agricultural specialists including some in our Department of Agriculture believe, on the basis of a large body of evidence, that the 1946 grain harvest was better than represented by the Soviet Union, and that the Soviet authorities exaggerated the extent of the 1946 drought. Conversely, they are convinced that last year's grain harvest was worse than represented by the Soviet authorities. The Department of Agriculture's keenest students of the USSR believe it is simply impossible that the Soviet grain crop in 1948 should have reached the figure published by the Soviet authorities. They point to evidences of drought in a number of important grain areas.

MR. MAGIDOFF. There are a couple of postwar developments that might have contributed to agricultural recovery. There was a planned and largely successful effort to make war veterans chairmen of collective farms, and the veterans introduced the discipline and organization they had learned in the army. There has also been concentration on applying the piecework system to agriculture on as large a scale as possible. At least 50 percent of the entire work in agriculture is now done on piecework basis.

May I also make a comment on electric power, because it does shed some light on relative strength? Since the USSR's war (as a matter of fact, it started during the war) the Russians have been concentrating on small and large hydroelectric stations, particularly in the Urals, Central Asia and the Caucasus. They claimed about two years ago the entire Sverdlovsk area in the Urals was completely electrified down to every village and hamlet. Other areas are being similarly electrified with the help of local peasant labor, which during the winter time would otherwise be idle.

Comparisons Misleading

HOW DOES over-all Soviet economic reconstruction and recovery compare with that of other nations? Mr. Barnes suggested that comparison with our own fantastic economic growth during the war would be a misleading index of Soviet strength. A more valid comparison would be with the rate of recovery in England or France.

MR. BERGSON. We have to bear in mind, Mr. Barnes, that the Russian losses not only absolutely but relatively exceeded those of the Western countries. We can only make conjectures on it, but the Russians may have lost as much as a quarter or a third of their fixed capital during the war, so that their recovery against that background is an impressive achievement.

MR. SCHWARTZ. This question of strength and weakness is a rather complex matter. It depends upon what you are trying to do with this notion. Even if the Soviet Union had achieved in 1948 the 1950 goals, and she certainly hadn't, she would still be far weaker in economic potential than the United States.

The Soviet Union realizes definitely, and will realize for many years to come, that it is relatively weak economically, vis-a-vis the Western world, particularly this country.

MR. BERGSON. If you just look at the statistics, coal production, steel production, total output, it is true the Russians are weak in comparison to the United States. Their economic potential is far below ours, even if you take the long-term goals that Stalin set in his speech some time ago. They were goals he anticipated might be achieved by 1965 or 1970, or thereabouts. The Russian potential will still be generally below that of the United States before the war. Now, I think that is important, and we have to bear it in mind in evaluating the Russian position; and yet I do feel we might err if we take a purely statistical view of this matter.

There are a great many other factors that affect Russia's

strength relative to the United States, and I think they ought to be taken into account. For example, it seems to me that a crucial factor in strength is the Russian geographic position, and the balance of forces on the continent of Europe. I have only the layman's view on this matter, but currently it seems to me that the Russians are in a position to occupy all of Europe in case of need in a fairly short time. I am not saying the Russians plan to do that, but I am saying that they are able to do that if necessary.

Now, in evaluating Russian strength, that is a very crucial fact to take into account. One has to think not of a Russia beyond the Iron Curtain, or a Russia beyond the old boundaries, but a Russia occupying a whole continent, a Russia which to some extent might be able to mobilize the resources of this continent, a Russia which has already taken steps to mobilize some resources of a part of this

continent, and which, because of its continental position, might be in a quite strong military position relative to the United States, in view of all the difficulties involved in overcoming a continental position of that sort.

One must think also, if one thinks of the long term, of the developments in Asia. Now, there is a very large question as to the length of time it will take for China to become an important factor in the world economic and political situation. I don't know, but my impression, based on Russian experience, is that Chinese industrialization under Communism might proceed much more rapidly than is believed in many places abroad, and one has to think of that also in estimating Russian strength or weakness.

When the Politburo evaluates its strength, it doesn't confine itself to figures on production; it considers all the factors that affect its ability to operate in case of conflict.

II. SOVIET LIVING STANDARDS

CHAIRMAN STRAIGHT suggested that the round table move on to the other aspect of an economic balance sheet—the human factor. To what extent, he asked, was industrial productivity rising at the expense of consumer standards? He raised the general question of the limitation on economic progress that might be exerted by human exhaustion and low morale resulting from poor living standards.

MR. SCHWARZ. What has happened to real wages since the end of the war? At the end of the war, they were very low, but it is impossible to measure them because at that time they had in Russia two sets of prices—ration prices and free or commercial prices—and the latter were 15 to 20 times higher than the ration prices. Whether people were eligible to get commodities under ration prices or free prices obviously affected the buying power of their wages. There exist no figures that make it possible to evaluate the level of real wages at that time.

Mr. Bergson said that real wages at the end of the war were approximately 40 percent lower than they were in 1940. I fear that is rather optimistic, but it is possible. Already in 1940 wages were very low compared with the level reached in 1938, because a new inflation began in Russia in 1938. That was because of preparation for the war. With 1948, rationing was ended, and now you have prices you can evaluate. These prices were announced at the end of 1947 in all the Soviet papers, for the first time. Prices were very high, shockingly so. It simply showed how few commodities existed.

The Russians are keeping prices up to bring the amount of commodities into some relation to buying power. They lowered the prices in April, 1947, on luxury commodities, which for the bulk of workers were without importance;

and now, on March 1 of this year, for the first time since the currency reform, they lowered prices generally by 10 percent. People can buy bread, meat, fish and butter at prices that have been lowered by 10 percent.

Now, we can try to compare the prices. From the point of view of real wages the best year in Russia was 1928, on the threshold of the Five-Year Plan. In that year real wages were already higher—perhaps 10 to 15 percent higher—than the pre-revolutionary level. Then came the first Five-Year Plan, with tremendous inflation, with tremendous loss in the buying power of workers and employees, and real wages decreased by 50 percent in 1932 and 1933. It was on this low level until 1935. In 1935, rationing was abolished once more. The prices remained stable for several years, and wages increased. That was the best period during the whole time of the Five-Year Plan policy.

In the year 1938, real wages reached their highest level in the thirties. Though it was much lower than in the year 1928, it was one at which people could halfway exist. Then came a new inflation, then the war, and then the present prices. It is useful to see what these prices are now.

Let's take bread. The price of this bread was, in 1928, eight kopecks a kilogram. In 1938, it went up to 85 kopecks; in 1948, to three rubles a kilogram; today, it is 2.7 rubles.

Average earnings in the year 1928 were 57.5 rubles a month. In the year 1938, ten years later, they were just five times as much—289 rubles. But bread was more than ten times as much as in 1928. And then today: earnings are little more than 500 rubles a month, 1.8 times as much as in 1938, and bread is more than three times the 1938 price.

With other things, it is a little better: beef, 87 kopecks

a kilogram in 1928; 7.60 to 11.50 rubles in 1938; today the price is 27 rubles; butter, 2.43 rubles in 1928, 17.50-20 rubles in 1938, 58 rubles today. If you set up a ratio from 1938 to 1949 you can get a clear picture. Taking the 1938 figures as one, you have today the figure for bread of over three; for butter also over three; for beef, three; for sugar, 3.8; and for wages, 1.8.

MR. BERGSON. What is the wage figure you are using for 1948?

MR. SCHWARZ. Five hundred and twenty rubles a month.

MR. SCHWARTZ. That's much too low. It is much closer to 600 rubles.

MR. MAGIDOFF. Yes.

MR. SCHWARZ. I doubt it but I will not discuss this. Take 600. It does not basically affect the ratios. So, it makes the decline since 1938 more than 25 percent, perhaps more than 30 percent.

These figures show the decline of weekly real earnings. The average working time also has increased: in 1938 it was, for manual workers, 42 hours a week; today it is 48 hours. Most of the non-manual workers in 1938 worked 66 hours a week, and today they also are working 48 hours a week. For the increased amount of time they have to work, they get much less in real wages than they did in 1938.

You will ask: If the wages are so low, how can a person exist? If a kilogram of butter costs 53 rubles, how can an average worker get butter? He cannot. So butter is a luxury product! Sugar is a luxury product! That is characteristic of the Russian living standard. It was partly true in the year 1938, but the situation was not as bad as it is today.

But without meat, without butter, it is impossible to have qualified workers. To solve the problem an extreme differentiation in payments developed in Russia. The figure of 500 or, as you say, 600, rubles a month is only an average. But in the same Russian plant, you find people who get 250, 300 and 400 rubles and people who get 2,000, 3,000, 5,000 rubles and more.

MR. SCHWARTZ. Some even make over 10,000 rubles a month. They do have salaries up in that bracket.

The Effect on Morale

MR. SCHWARZ. If the average is 600 rubles, and if these 10,000 rubles are averaged in, then a lot of people must be getting much less than the average to bring the figure to the level of 600. How can they exist? They do

exist! In what way? First, whole families are working—not only the men, but women and children from 14 up. Second, the great majority of them have vegetable gardens which yield a great amount of potatoes, cabbage and other vegetables, but they require a great amount of care and work. This is besides the 48 hours on the job. Bread, potatoes and cabbage; that is the basis of the existence of Russian workers.

So, the living standards are very low, lower than they were before the war, and even much lower than they were before the introduction of the Five-Year Plan policy. How is the morale?

That problem, to some extent, does not exist for the Soviet managers. People are not asked what their morale is, and they are accustomed to not being asked that question, and to be silent, because if they are not silent the same thing happens to them that happened to Anna Louise Strong.

MR. SCHWARTZ. They will not be deported to New York.

MR. SCHWARZ. They will be deported to other areas where they will have to work more than they do at present and be paid less than they get at present, and where these difficult conditions will appear as a kind of freedom!

Also, they do not know how hard their situation is. They have to believe that theirs is a favorable position, and that abroad it is much worse.

MR. L. FISCHER. The American peasants are starving!

MR. SCHWARZ. It is true that a part of the American population does live under conditions which cannot be considered halfway satisfactory in a civilized society. But the same conditions which appear intolerable here by our criteria would appear enviable in Russia, because the great majority of Russian workers live under conditions which are much worse. That's the situation.

MR. SCHWARTZ. A good deal of what Mr. Schwarz has said I would agree with wholeheartedly, but I'd like to put the thing into a bit better perspective. Life in Russia is hard today. It has always been hard for the great majority of the people. For our present purposes, the changes are important.

The basic thing to remember is this. The Russian standard of living sank to fantastically low levels during the war. The ration levels, which were barely enough to sustain life, were rarely, if ever, completely fulfilled. They had to substitute potatoes for bread at times. What has happened in the last four or five years has been a marked improvement over this fantastically low level.

From the point of view of this oppressed group of millions of Russian workers, the present situation is substan-

HOW RELIABLE ARE SOVIET STATISTICS?

MR. SCHWARTZ. The record of this discussion should carry very clearly the statement that all of us who have studied Soviet economy are completely at the mercy of statistics published by the Soviet government. We don't know whether those statistics are true, even in their context, and we aren't quite sure of the meaning of those statistics. We have good reason for believing that, at best, their meaning is such as to exaggerate the rise of production.

MR. BERGSON. One has to be a poet or a dramatist to describe Russian statistics, and I am neither.

The Russians withhold statistics, not merely statistics on their immediate military activities, but statistics reaching far back into their economic situation. There are many, many tantalizing gaps. The Russians are not especially concerned to explain the nature of the statistics they do publish. They are quite careless. They may publish a figure without making clear what it means, what territory it refers to, and so forth. There are many methodological deficiencies in the collection, processing and dissemination of the statistics. Some of these deficiencies lead to distortions in the final results, so that some of the Soviet statistics, for purely methodological reasons, give an exaggerated view.

Furthermore, the Russians are rather tolerant of methodological deficiencies which do give an exaggerated view of their position. But finally, for a variety of reasons, I am convinced they do not falsify their statistics outright, which means they do not make a four out of a two. I am not saying that I think this is so because they are honest, or because they believe that honesty is the best policy. Regardless of their views on honesty being the best policy, for a variety of reasons they find it administratively expedient, at least, not to falsify statistics outright.

That means that there is a certain core of truth that we have to operate with in studying Soviet economy. That is the basis for most of the work that goes on in this country in this field.

MR. SCHWARTZ. Dr. Bergson is right. We have to use these statistics; we have no others. It is a difficult task to use them. Generally, they are not falsified, but are so presented that they are difficult for an outsider to use. They cannot falsify them too much, because they need them for their own use administratively. Soviet officials also must work with these figures. If they were simply falsified statements, there would be a mess.

MR. HINDUS. I don't know any more about the accuracy of the statistics than anybody else does, but it is

significant that after the slaughter of the livestock (which was one of the great tragedies of the Revolution), toward the end of the first Five-Year Plan, the statistics they published were not at all a credit to Soviet animal husbandry. In this case they have published unfavorable statistics quite frequently. The latest figures on livestock are very bad from the Soviet Russian standpoint, yet they have published them.

MR. SCHWARTZ. I would be interested to see any firm statement by Soviet authorities as to the total number of livestock in the Soviet Union as of January 1, 1949. This is a very good example of how Soviet statements are aimed at conveying what is probably an incorrect impression, because the statements issued regarding livestock on January 1, 1949, relate only to livestock in the collective farms, ignoring the large numbers that belong to other owners.

The best opinion at the present moment seems to be that the Plan set in 1947 for the number of livestock, except hogs, to be regained by January 1, 1949, was not regained; but the Russians have not acknowledged the failure of that Plan, and instead make statements regarding only the livestock in the collective farms.

Have you seen a figure giving the total number of cattle, hogs, and so on, as of January 1, 1949?

MR. HINDUS. No, I haven't, not so recent as that. I am referring to the figures they have given in the supplementary volume of the *Encyclopedia*. Certainly, they are unfavorable to Russia.

MR. BERGSON. The general point that Mr. Hindus makes is quite in order. The Russians have published unfavorable information. In the case of livestock, they did publish statistics before the war which indicated the drastic losses under the collectivization drive. It is interesting how they published them; when they published their volume on the fulfillment of the first Five-Year Plan, they omitted these statistics, and pointed to the great successes in fulfilling the first Five-Year Plan, referring primarily to industrial developments in any case, and not including information on the failures, in the case of agriculture.

They didn't falsify these figures on livestock. They just didn't publish them. Ultimately, in another publication, they did reveal the statistics on the development of livestock, and Mr. Hindus is referring to published data running right up to 1940, which, it is true, indicate an unfavorable position. My impression is that the total herds, as of 1940, were probably below the level of 1928, which is not a very pleasant picture.

tially better than that which they had been accustomed to during the war, and to the extent that Soviet propaganda does make an impression upon them (and I am sure it does make some), they are seeing concretely in some of these price reductions the beginning of the fulfillment of the promises made to them of the better life.

We must understand that. We mustn't underestimate. If we do, we do it at the peril of incorrect judgment. More housing is being built, more schools, food and other commodities are becoming cheaper. The papers even publish complaints as to why the department stores don't have proper delivery service. They have begun to exhibit washing machines and refrigerators in Moscow. These are all signs. The basic truth is a hard life, but it is a life which is improving for all of them, not just for a few.

MR. MAGIDOFF. Ever since December, 1947—that is after the currency reform—there has been improvement. Still the standard of living is so abominably low that the government, which usually pays little attention to it, is trying to improve the situation for fear that the strain would break the Russian worker.

As in everything else, the government started out by feeding the people with propaganda.

Another, a much more concrete thing, is being done—giving the people social services. The government claims that the various social services—lower rents, free medical care, free education—add as much as 38 percent to wages.

MR. BERTRAM WOLFE. One word about social services. We underestimate the extent to which propaganda is charged on the budget as a social service. Has anyone ever made a breakdown to see how much the government is charging its propaganda war of nerves, if you please, to the Soviet people as one of the great social services?

MR. BERGSON. As far as I know, the expenditures on the press and the Red Corners are included in the budget under the heading of education or social culture, and accordingly, they tend to inflate the total. That 38-percent figure is not mine. I am guilty of many sins, but not that.

Consumer Goods

MR. MAGIDOFF. More consumer goods are available now than at any time in the last two years. Odd enough, the first things that appeared in the stores after the war were refrigerators, a luxury in Russia. Now, they are followed by automobiles, also a luxury. But the contribution of the satellite nations in the consumer-goods fields is much more real. It also allows the Soviets to concentrate more on heavy industry. Even before I was expelled last April, you could buy Czechoslovakian shoes of comparatively excellent quality in Moscow, Kiev and other cities. You could buy Polish textiles and Bulgarian tobacco.

We should not underestimate the advances they have made in housing. The housing situation is probably the weakest single point in their standard of living; but the fact remains that at the end of the war 25 million people in western Russia were living in dugouts and trenches, and by last summer—it is, of course, a tragically long period—they moved out the last of these 25 million from the dugouts and trenches into something which they called dwelling space. It wouldn't be considered that here. Everything is comparative. If a man moves from a dugout into a room which he shares with three other people, and also shares a bathroom and kitchen with three or four other families, it is still an improvement for this particular person.

MR. BERGSON. Russian living standards are abysmally low in relation to American living standards. They are, however, rather high in relation to Indian or Chinese living standards. Now, being Americans, I suppose we like to compare Russian living standards with American living standards. It is not clear, off-hand, whether the comparison with India or the United States is particularly important. The more important comparison is perhaps with the Russians' own previous achievements.

Here my feeling is that Mr. Schwarz may be overly pessimistic, but undoubtedly this is a weak point in the Russian picture. Living standards did decline under the first Five-Year Plan. They were raised under the second. They declined again under the third. They declined even more during the war, and now there is no question that they are rather low. They are lower than they were, let us say, in 1940, and may even be lower than they were on the eve of the first Five-Year Plan in 1928, if you consider only commodities, and not education and social services, where there have been large gains.

Thus, the progress has been extremely limited. If we consider the entire period, 1928 to 1948, it is doubtful that there has been any progress in living standards. There may have been a decline. We have to consider the reasons for this, which, undoubtedly, are in the minds of the Russian people. There is no question that one factor is Soviet policy, the policy of emphasizing heavy industries, but there are other factors which cannot be entirely identified with policy.

There is an intermediate situation, such as the livestock loss under collectivization in the first Five-Year Plan. This was an unanticipated result of policy but hardly an inherent feature of planning. These livestock losses deserve a lot of emphasis. Owing to these losses, the Russians' possibilities of raising living standards from the Eastern European level to the Western European level were severely limited in a vast variety of fields. Livestock is the source of a great many things which differentiate a Western standard from an Eastern standard, such as butter, meat, leather, woolen goods, and so on. These, of course, together with housing, are the things which the Russians

have been extremely short of. These are the key scarcities in the Soviet Union.

In addition, there is the war situation. This is clearly over and above the policy element. The losses during the war were tremendous, and they set the Russians back very far. What you have is a combination, then, a variety of factors partly due to the Russians' own policy, and partly due to factors beyond their control, the net result of which is to lead to very, very little progress, or perhaps a decline in a two-decade period.

Now, I am sure the Russian people are very conscious that the war was an extremely important factor in the decline of living standards, and in determining their attitude toward the regime they are certainly going to bear that in mind. For that reason, they will probably give a good deal of weight to postwar developments, and there is no question that, since the war, there has been some rather impressive progress.

While the government is still emphasizing heavy industries, it has managed to increase the production of consumer goods rather rapidly, and even in housing they have made some real gains, this last year. Up to last year, housing was very far behind, but probably with a reduction in quality and an emphasis on temporary quarters, they are making real progress in housing the people who were left homeless during the war.

They did manage, a year after they promised, to do away with rationing, and it is rather interesting that they have been able to supply enough goods at, it is true, high prices, to maintain the open market since they restored it. They have actually been able to cut prices.

I want to emphasize this because probably these developments in the last couple of years do bulk large in the Russian people's thinking. The people, I am sure, are wise enough to understand that their low living standards are not entirely due to government policy; that they are, to a very noticeable extent, due to the tremendous losses inflicted by the Germans. Their loyalty, their attitude toward the government, has to be envisaged in this light, and considering that, I feel Mr. Schwarz's presentation may be not only too pessimistic as to the facts, but possibly too pessimistic with regard to his conclusions on Soviet morale.

Is the Regime Blamed?

MR. INKELES. Although I agree with Mr. Bergson that many Soviet workers may be looking forward to an improvement in their situation, if they think in terms of their past experiences and put these against the promises of the regime, a lot of people might entertain very severe doubts as to how likely of fulfillment these promises are. Since they have had striking experience of economic ups and downs, and the overall economic advance for the average citizen, in terms of standard of living, has been very

modest, there must be real limits on the faith the Soviet citizen can be expected to put in promises of the future's potentialities.

At the same time the promises the regime is making, along with the improvement in conditions that the economists have pointed out, are important. To a man who is in an extraordinarily difficult position, a very slight improvement, if it comes as a part of a series, is very likely to make him believe that the series will be continuous.

MR. BERGSON. I don't think the improvements are slight with regard to the situation in 1945.

MR. INKELES. I am certainly willing to accept that. These people may be looking forward to an improved situation in the future; nevertheless, they have a sense of considerable difficulties now. It might be desirable to take up the point of where they place the blame for this, which Mr. Bergson has raised.

I would, on the whole, go along with Mr. Bergson, in his statement that it isn't the Soviet system that is held responsible. If it is true, therefore, that the average Soviet citizen tends not to hold the regime responsible for these difficulties, but rather conditions like the war and the added element of bureaucracy which he is always encouraged to blame, this may have a considerable impact on the effectiveness of the government's program and its ability to get something out of the people.

In connection with this program, the constant hubbub in the Soviet press about the "abominable" bureaucrats and the difficulties they are causing is likely to have some impact on the thinking of the average worker.

There may be, of course, a boomerang effect here; you can say to the worker that he doesn't have shoes because some bureaucrat is falling down on the job in the shoe factory; but if you do say it, and if you say it over again, and yet if after the bureaucrat has been removed there are still not enough shoes, then it is not the bureaucrat who will be held responsible, but the Soviet system itself and the Communist Party leadership.

MR. SCHWARTZ. The point of who is held to blame raises very interesting speculations in regard to two things. First, there is the anti-American campaign today, because the scapegoat may very well be the foreigners who force the concentration on heavy industry; and second, the very interesting rise of official propaganda directed more or less directly against certain Jewish elements in the Soviet Union.

MR. INKELES. I myself am unable to tell to what degree, if any, there is any lessening of tension by virtue of the scapegoat device. They not only make scapegoats in the contemporary sense, but they still bring up the old symbols like the "grasping capitalist," who is still much mentioned. I am rather in doubt, though, as to the extent

to which the average Soviet citizen is able successfully to get rid of much of his tension in this way. It is difficult, of course, to assess the importance of scapegoating tendencies in any society. It may be said that you have no symbol equivalent to the American Negro as scapegoat in the Soviet Union. Furthermore, symbols like the capitalist are not very tangible. They are not present on the scene. It is easier to get rid of tension against the bureaucrat, of course, because he is present, and very tangible in the USSR.

MR. MAGIDOFF. There is a question which intrigues me and that is Soviet workers' attitude toward their jobs. Despite the fact that for 32 years every day the Soviet press has been telling the worker that he owns the country, the factories, everything, I found his attitude (not only in Moscow, where they are tending to be more cynical, but also in the outlying areas) similar to that of any worker—and that is, what does he get out of it? The Soviet government is quite conscious of that, and has the most complicated incentive system in the world, whereby one gets in remuneration for a particular effort anything from a pair of shoes or a couple of yards of cloth up to an automobile or an apartment. This differentiation—to talk of it as the creation of a class society is decidedly premature—does create a sort of class feeling. There are privileged groups such as generals, academicians, party bureaucrats and others, but interestingly enough, not particularly the mass of party membership. The Soviets are strengthened by the fact that the party has not been identified in the eyes of the nation with corruption and with special privilege.

But taking all this into consideration, I still believe that the weakest link in Russia's war potential is the low morale of its people.

MR. RICHARD LAUTERBACH. On this question of worker morale, with what experience I have had, I would agree with Bob. But does he think it holds true for a very important category of the labor force, the 18-year-olds? It seemed that almost every group of those with whom I

came in contact still believed in the idea that they owned a piece of their country, that they were working on something which gave them more than whatever wage it was they received at the end of the week, or at the end of the month; and I wonder, also, about the new age groups that are going into the army. How much of that do they believe? How far down in age groups does the cynicism go?

MR. MAGIDOFF. When you get hold of that age group, you are much more likely to succeed than with others. When we speak of Russian workers, however, we do not mean the teen-agers.

MR. LAUTERBACH. Anyone working in the US solely on the basis of statistics can make an erroneous evaluation of Soviet strength or weakness. I offer, as an example, the question of washing machines and refrigerators. It is difficult, just looking at statistics, to realize the psychological lift that the appearance of washing machines and refrigerators in Moscow's department stores gives to people who don't have any immediate hope of acquiring them.

You look at the statistics and say, "Well, they only produced 8,400 washing machines. Obviously, only people making 12,000 rubles and above will benefit. Therefore, this has no impact on Soviet morale, or on the entire structure." It does, psychologically. Eventually, when the people recognize it may be generations before all of them can possibly acquire washing machines, there can be a very bad reaction, but initially it lifts up people's spirits.

The selection of washing machines and refrigerators is not just a fluke. During the war when any of us asked Russians what they wanted after the war, their answers almost invariably were symbols of American culture as they understood it—the washing machine, the refrigerator, and the automobile. The decision to push refrigerators and washing machines for postwar show-window purposes, was not reached on a purely statistical basis. The Politburo, I think, considered what the machines would contribute, psychologically, to giving people hope that their postwar dreams might some time be fulfilled.

III. SOCIAL DIFFERENTIATION

THE EXTENT and significance of social differentiation in the USSR was subjected to critical and sometimes conflicting analysis.

MR. INKELES. If social differentiation has progressed rapidly in the Soviet Union, is this an important element in the assessment of strength or weakness of the Soviet regime? The general impression is that this perhaps is an element of weakness. This reasoning is largely based on a certain set of values or criteria as to what Soviet society

should be. All Socialists, for example, are somewhat shocked by the extent of social differentiation in the Soviet Union. But that is not the same as saying it is an element of strength or weakness.

To a significant degree, this factor of social differentiation may act more as a source of strength than weakness, so long as you have one essential condition, that is, relatively open access to advantageous positions.

If a worker who is in a disadvantageous position recognizes that it is possible to achieve and live at a much higher

standard of life than the one he has so far attained, this may encourage him to put out the extra effort on which, to a surprising degree, the Soviet regime relies.

It is fair to say that on the whole the Soviet regime has rewarded certain segments of the population with a much higher income than that of the average worker. If you accept its assumption that persons so rewarded are the most crucial people in the production mechanism, then socially this is an important source of strength.

The skilled-workers group, the managerial and technical personnel are crucial to the effective functioning of a large-scale industrial social order. In so far as the Soviet Union continues to reward these people in such a way as to make them loyal to the Soviet regime, or at least to identify their success in their own personal advancement with the success of the Soviet regime, the scheme will be successful. It may actually be very effective in keeping the Soviet regime operating at a moderately high level of efficiency.

MR. WOLFE. There are a certain number who feel identified with the regime because they are, or believe they are, beneficiaries of it. They are a smallish minority of the total population, but in a land so large, they represent a few million. They strengthen the regime, because they feel that their small privileges are identified with it.

Second, there is a group who feel continuous resentment as a result of wage differentiation. In any given factory, there are a limited number of "shock workers" who set the pace. The bulk of the workers have no hope of reaching anything like the top speed-up figures. On the contrary, their expectation is that after a short time all piece-work compensation will be cut because the model worker has shown it can be done faster.

Consequently, along with that element which associates itself with the regime, there is the more numerous element which resents it. However, the resentment is directed against the speed-up workers, against the exemplary workers, rather than against the officials who have decreed the speed-up system, and still less against the Soviet system or the state system as a whole.

A third kind of differentiation lies in the privileges of the bureaucracy as a whole plus their minstrels, actors, artists, and so on. This is an entirely different type of differentiation and represents an ever greater charge against the total production of Soviet society.

The average worker is angered when he hears that at a time of general shortage of the things he needs, summer homes, washing machines, automobiles, and so on, are being produced for the bureaucracy. He has no illusion that they are being produced "for the state." Things like washing machines are privately enjoyed. The Russians have a proverb, "*Peshii konnomu ne tovarisch*" ("The man who walks and the man who rides on horseback are not comrades"). Now, if that was true in ancient Russia, how much more so in modern Russia? The man who rides

in the chauffeured automobile that speeds past, and the man who walks, are not comrades.

One of the early concerns of Lenin was this fear of "bureaucratization" of the new state, its officials, and of the party. That is why he set up a maximum salary for party members. What he feared has now happened: the growing apart of the official and the common man. Yet it seems to me that in a regime which attempts to socialize on the basis of scarcity, this kind of gap between the common man and the ruling layers is inevitable.

To give only one example: there were in Russia in 1917 but 9,000 automobiles. How can 9,000 cars be "socialized"? Only by becoming the property of the state and the prerogative of officials, so that those who "work for all" may "ride for all." Since 1931 Stalin has proclaimed Lenin's dream of equalitarianism an "enemy" idea and class or caste privilege has become an official aim. But the fundamental cause is no man's will or malice, but the attempt to attain socialism in a regime of pre-capitalist scarcity. The socialization of a capacity for abundance would likely give other results.

Money Can't Be Spent

MR. HINDUS. I don't quite agree with all the thinking that I have listened to on the whole question of social differentiation in Russia because of difference in income.

The paradox of the whole thing is that you have a scarcity economy. I know writers, musicians and factory directors in Russia, who make a lot of money and can't get good apartments, for two reasons: because Russian construction is so poor that they can't build good apartments; second, when they do put up a new house, two or at most three rooms are allowed no matter how large a family is. Often you share a kitchen with other families.

What I am getting at is that factual rewards in terms of things don't allow you—from the point of view of superiority of earning power—to enjoy a higher standard of living, because of a scarcity of goods.

During the war years, I became acquainted with a high-salaried factory director in Russia. I went to his house once for supper. He had only a two-room apartment, and I can assure you that an ordinary worker in this country earning \$50 a week wouldn't want the kind of plumbing in his apartment that this man had. A writer like Sholokhov probably has all the money anybody would want in Russia, but Sholokhov can't buy a suit of clothes of the kind he would really enjoy. During the war years a man like Simonov would dash off to Rumania and return with three or four suits of a kind nobody in Russia had.

You just cannot spend your money in such a way that you really enjoy conspicuous consumption, to such an extent that it would make differentiation as obvious as it would be in a country where you had a lot of goods. Of course, members of the Politburo, and a few other privi-

leged people, of whom there aren't very many, can get anything they want.

I often said to Russians, during the war years especially, "Well, what is going to happen in your country with all this differential in earning power when you get to the point where you can really buy things? Then you will have a real problem; then you will have the same thing that you have in a capitalist country, because a man earning a lot of money will be flaunting it. You will have a kind of conspicuous consumption."

Invariably, the reply I got was this, and I don't believe we should ignore it. "When we get to that point," they said; "where we really have a lot of goods, and can go into a store and buy as you do in America, there won't be this differential in earning power. We can always take care of that through a system of taxation."

MR. BERGSON. I feel we may be exaggerating this discrepancy, because we are looking for the wrong thing.

Given the extremely low standards in Russia, the important differentiation would come not from some people having palaces and yachts, but from some people having meat, butter and such things. The kind of conspicuous consumption you are looking for is something you would expect on a large scale only when the whole populace moves up. For the present, the equivalent of conspicuous consumption is that people with higher money incomes can go to the store and buy meat, butter, etc., and in amounts which the very low income groups cannot afford.

MR. INKELES. A parent who is an ordinary worker will not resent the system on the basis of his own welfare alone so long as he has a reasonable belief that if he has a child who is talented, that child may achieve a higher social position. To a large degree, you can say there is definite differentiation in the United States. Yet you don't expect the American system to collapse because of this differentiation. The crucial test of the Soviet system in terms of future strength is whether it will be able to keep an open system of access to these desirable positions within the society. I notice some narrowing on this score. I feel there is an increasing tendency now among the intelligentsia to try to pass along those privileges which they have to their children. One index of this is the introduction of fees in the last two years of high school, secondary education, and also in the universities. If these trends continue, differentiation may have a much greater impact.

MR. ERNEST J. SIMMONS. Mr. Chairman, the whole aspect of differentiation is definitely implicit in the present state of Soviet socialism. There is just no argument about it. From each according to his ability, to each according to his work. It is there, and there is nothing much more to say about it.

MR. SCHWARZ. Is it not anti-Marxist?

MR. SIMMONS. It's not anti-Marxist. So long as the merit system is maintained, there can be no further argument about it.

MR. L. FISCHER. Anybody who saw the present upper class begin to differentiate itself in the latter twenties and thirties will know that the cause was not economic. It sprang from a differentiation of power, and the expression is economic, but not the cause. As the Soviets became merely paper organizations, as the trade unions became only rubber stamps, as the party became an automaton of its leaders, a group emerged that had the power, and the first people who had the material privileges were those who had the power. They weren't the most productive people from the point of view of economics. The first people who had privileges were the GPU people. Then came the army. Then came the party and government officials. Later on, there came the bureaucracy and the high-class workers.

Now, I have no resentment about washing machines, and so on, but if I understand the psychology of the Soviet person, he would say, "This just strengthens the people who have us by the throat, who already have so much when we have so little. Why not distribute it?"

I think the differentiation is the weakest point in the morale of the Soviet people, because it emphasizes that they are politically powerless.

When I talked to several score, perhaps one hundred, of the Soviet deserters who are now in Germany, and who were in Russia until 1944, they stressed two things: that the average Soviet citizen knows that he has no power, and we know that he has no power, to influence government policy, and second, that there is an upper class. This is the Achilles' heel of the Soviet regime, that it had to allow an upper class to emerge, and now this upper class proves that there is no democracy, and there is no material well-being for the mass. Inkeles made the crucial point when he talked about education, where, now, this upper class is perpetuating itself by controlling the universities and squeezing out the lower classes.

Fees in Schools

MR. MAGIDOFF. I wouldn't exaggerate that point. It is true you have to pay tuition, but every student, whether he pays or not, gets a monthly wage.

MR. INKELES. Those who get good grades.

MR. MAGIDOFF. Every student gets a monthly wage which starts at 150 rubles a month and goes up to 250. Those who have good grades also get scholarships, and they don't have to pay tuition fees.

MR. BERGSON. Well, the new development in 1940 was

the setting up of the State Labor Reserve system. Under this system, youths are drafted for vocational training, and are then allocated to jobs by administrative action for a period of several years. The Russians say that some youths volunteer, and they also say that some youths of real distinction may have an opportunity to go beyond the vocational education, but we have little information as to how important that is. It is fairly safe to say that a large number of youths are drafted. They acknowledge this and also that a large number of them are allocated to jobs, to the coal mines, to the steel mills, in accordance with administrative decision. That law was introduced in 1940.

MR. L. FISCHER. At the same time they introduced the paid tuition.

MR. BERGSON. That is right. It was thought of at the time by some as an emergency measure, in view of the international situation, but it is still in effect, and it is clear that the government plans to rely on the Labor Reserve Schools as a major source of new labor, skilled and semi-skilled, for industry at least through 1950.

There is no indication at all that they plan to abandon the system after that. The Russians discuss this matter as if it were an established feature of the system. I think that is a significant development, along with the fees. Maybe there isn't any wind blowing, but maybe these are straws in the wind. The society has only been functioning for 30 years, and it is a little early to make any categorical statements about social stratification and perpetuation of

classes. But these developments certainly have to be considered in this connection.

The Russians have said that students who distinguished themselves in the schools can then go on to higher education, but there is a quantitative problem, you see, as to how many students are permitted to go on.

Let us consider one other matter here. This is a question of fact. I understand that students who are in the secondary schools already—the ordinary secondary schools—are exempted from the draft for the Labor Reserve Schools. There is a question which arises here because the opportunities to go to secondary schools are probably not evenly distributed throughout the country and the exception may tend to favor urban youth in comparison with rural youth, and it may tend to favor youth of the better-to-do in comparison with the poorer. There is a further fact that tuition was set up not merely for colleges but also for the secondary schools.

MR. SCHWARTZ. May I point out one further thing? Suvarov Schools, which take kids at a very early age and train them for a high place in society, are part of a growing rigidity in the system. They teach them ballroom dancing!

MR. WOLFE. In 1931, Stalin made a speech called "New Conditions and New Tasks" in which he made the first public attack upon equalitarianism. That has been echoed in every conceivable form ever since, and has gradually begun to be realized with wider and wider significance in actual practice.

IV. GOVERNMENT AND PARTY

THE DISCUSSION at this point veered from economics to politics and government. Had the Communist Party emerged from the war strengthened in authority and prestige? Were there signs of a relaxation in the dictatorship? Had the Soviet combination of centralization and federalism solved the problem of national minorities? Chairman Straight asked Professor John Hazard to lead off the discussion on these matters.

MR. HAZARD. In a group such as this, I don't have to explain why I am going to begin the consideration of government with a consideration of the Communist Party. Perhaps for your readers it will be necessary to explain that in a one-party system, all questions of government begin with the party.

I want to start with the Communist Party. It seems to me that the major event which came out of the war was inflation. I am not talking about money inflation, but party inflation. The party grew from a figure of 2,400,000 in 1939—that is including candidates—to 5,700,000 in

1945. This was not alone a question of growth in numbers; there was the additional factor that a great many of the experienced party members were killed in the war, so that the turnover was apparently very large.

I have computed that in the year 1943 alone, the figure showed 500,000 party members killed. That was in just that one year, so this turnover was very great. We have to consider the growth of the party not only in terms of absolute numbers, but in terms of watering down of experience. That fact was brought out in 1946 by the party figures which showed that two-thirds of the members of the party in 1946 had been admitted during the preceding five years. In other words, two-thirds of the party membership had less than five years' experience in the party; and 63.6 percent of that same membership was under the age of 35 years.

So that when the war was over, you had a party with very little experience, great youth, and which was by no means the kind of an organization which Lenin anticipated when he formed it in 1903. That fact has been ap-

preciated by the party. They created last year a higher school under the Central Committee of the party and ordered the schooling over the next three or four years of all leaders in provincial organizations and below. In other words, they told their top people that they had to go back to political school. This fact, that the bulk of the leadership is inexperienced, may have accounted for the delay in calling the All-Union Congress which is now seven years overdue.

Now, in spite of the fact that this leadership is weak, in the sense that the bulk is inexperienced, we have to go further to study the relationship between the party and the state to find out whether or not this weakness is material. Has it meant that the party has lost control, or even reduced its control of the state apparatus? The answer to that is no.

The percentage of party membership in the Supreme Soviet is now 81. In 1937, it was 76.2. In other words, party control has increased to the extent that the party membership among deputies has increased in the Supreme Soviet. The percentage of party membership in the leading republics is 80.4. When you go down to the provinces, districts, cities, villages, the 1948 elections have indicated a wide variation, especially in the brand-new republics—Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and so on—where the percentage of party members among the deputies of the lower Soviets is as low as 11 percent in Lithuania and as high as 25 percent in Estonia.

In Azerbaijan and the Uzbek Republic, the percentage of the party membership is high—about 50 percent. In republics which have acquired large parts of Poland and Czechoslovakia, namely the Ukraine and Byelorussia, there is in the Ukraine an intermediate 31 percent among the provincial and lower soviets, and in Byelorussia 26 percent. I would say, then, that the party has by no means lost control or even reduced its control in the apparatus of the state during the postwar period, although its members are from any analysis less good party members in terms of experience than they were before. There is no noticeable fear of losing control on the part of the party.

In the provincial congresses held last year, the theme song, as reported in *Bolshevik*, was, "Get out of operations." It is explained that during the war it was necessary for the party to participate in detail and that now the time had come when it can go back to the ivory tower and look, and think, and guide. Incidentally, this may be one of the things which explains the recent withdrawal of Molotov, Bulganin and Mikoyan from positions as Ministers.

MR. SCHWARTZ. On the other hand, in cases where a city or a particular industry is backward, there seems to be the reverse propaganda urging the party to get into operations. It is all the local party committee's fault. They didn't exercise close enough supervision. On the one hand, get out of operations; on the other hand, it is your fault, brother. You should have been in there pitching.

MR. HAZARD. There are always time lags in carrying out policy decisions in the Soviet system, and it may be that it took one year after the rule went out to get the party out of operations before these top men move to the ivory tower to watch, guide and direct, rather than shuffle the operating papers.

This maintenance of position of leadership by the party is to my mind nowhere so clearly shown as in relationship to the army. I remember during the war seeing a British report to the effect that after the war we could expect the army in the place of the party, that all history had shown that a great war made marshals the chiefs. I thought it was foolish, and time has shown that all of us who thought it was foolish, including all of us in this room, have been vindicated. Not a single marshal was added to the Politburo as a marshal.

MR. L. FISCHER. The members of the Politburo became marshals!

MR. HAZARD. In the Ministry of Defense, a member of the political staff, Bulganin, was raised to the level of marshal and became Minister of Defense on Stalin's retirement. Only, incidentally, in the last week has a career army man been made head of the system. Marshal Vasilovsky has been placed at the top of the Ministry of Defense.

The army does not appear to be a factor in politics, and I never include it in a discussion of political forces in the USSR. I may be very remiss.

As to the structure of the government: immediately after the war, the emergency agencies of the government were liquidated, including the State Committee for Defense, which controlled not only the government but the party. The military situation was officially terminated by statute, which was applied everywhere, except in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and in the former Polish parts of the Ukraine, and Byelorussia. Those are still under military order. This meant that for the bulk of the country, there was a restoration of peacetime procedures and agencies, particularly important in connection with court procedure.

The elections have all been held regularly since the war on the national level in 1946, the republic level in 1947, provincial and below in 1948. It is interesting to note that there is some evidence that the government is quite confident of its ability to control, in that for the first time it permitted the announcement in an election of the defeat of candidates. One hundred and two districts reported that the one candidate named was defeated. That is, of course, very small in the total. There were 766,563 people elected to the local Soviets of the RSFSR alone. But never before since the Soviet has been reporting has anybody been reported as defeated. This is an indication that the leaders are confident, in some measure, of their position of control.

I find in the administrative apparatus a reflection of a situation which must be the result of a shortage of skilled

men. From the year 1930 on, the number of ministries was increased constantly until it reached a high of 59 in the federal government in 1947. Since then, there have been amalgamations. The tide has turned. There have been continuing reductions of the number by combining the ministries. Four were eliminated by the end of 1948, and since then there have been more.

This is stated as being the result of a lack of skilled personnel, requiring the use of the men they have to better advantage. Curiously enough, the same reduction is going on in the divisions of rayons (districts). Rayons are being amalgamated throughout the country, in the wards and the cities—the wards in the cities are being combined, so that there are fewer of them.

Now, you have one other question here which interests me a great deal and that is the relaxation of the dictatorship. Since the war, the special boards of the Ministry of the Interior have continued to function. I have no idea how many people have been exiled. Under the continuation of martial law in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the former regions of Poland, all criminal-court work is handled by the Ministry of the Interior. Elsewhere, criminal-court work has been restored to the Ministry of Justice. But the special boards of the Ministry of Interior are functioning, and in the particular republics indicated, the regular criminal courts are in the hands of the Interior. It is obvious that a great many people have been removed from those zones.

At the same time, curiously enough, there is an increasing number of Supreme Court decisions reported reversing convictions in lower courts, and reversing them on the ground that the lower courts have handed down a conviction which is not supported by the evidence, or which violates the rules of criminal procedure.

MR. SCHWARTZ. Is that why the court lost so many members recently?

MR. HAZARD. This work of the Supreme Court has been the work, as I see it, primarily of the Chief Justice.

MR. SCHWARTZ. He was removed.

MR. HAZARD. Yes, he was removed. He was the most liberal of all of their jurists. He has been plugging for years to get across the idea that justice demands observance of the rules, and what his removal means I don't know.

MR. BARNES. Under a single-candidate system, if a candidate for the Soviet gets defeated, what happens?

MR. HAZARD. In all those cases, they call for a new election. They have had a great deal of trouble with the local Soviets, another factor which I haven't taken up. It is indicated that the provincial soviets were running the local soviets through agents. What an agent is, I am

not quite certain, unless he be an official of the provincial soviet who goes down and tells the local soviets what to do. That has been pointed out as being a wrong approach, that the problem is one of leadership rather than direction. What they ought to do is go down and guide the local soviets through the work which they have to do rather than telling them what to do. There is tremendous emphasis upon getting the local boys back into affairs. Apparently, the local boys have lost interest. There is one report that a local soviet held a meeting and only one member came.

MR. SCHWARTZ. There have been lots of complaints that the ministries and their subordinate organizations go into the game of passing resolutions. Nothing happens. It is all a paper world that these people operate in.

MR. HAZARD. You raise a point that is a great problem of socialism, as I see it. You have planning, which is supposed to produce more than a capitalist world can produce, but in order to plan you have to have paper work, and you have to have a bureaucracy to handle the paper work. There comes the point at which it may be that the savings you make through planning are eaten up by the bureaucracy that is shuffling the papers. There was a remark in a 1948 speech of the Minister of Justice that the paper work demanded of the courts was so great that some courts had no time left to try cases.

How Much Regimentation?

MR. MAGIDOFF. A basic weakness of Soviet society, and especially the Soviet economy, is the field of responsibility. This is where there is a great deal of paper work. Fearing responsibility, they procrastinate and wait until some higher-up official, or the Politburo, makes a resolution that will untie their hands.

A sign of the relaxation of regimentation is the easing up on the wartime law which really made serfs out of the workers. They could not leave the job without specific permission.

MR. SCHWARTZ. Just a minute, Mr. Magidoff. In July, 1946, there was a front-page story in *Pravda* denouncing the fact that many laborers didn't have labor books and demanding that in the months of July and August, the trade unions take it as their central task to give all the workers who didn't have books their proper books and to make sure that management obeyed the law strictly, and demanded a labor book before hiring.

MR. MAGIDOFF. That is slightly beside the point. Whether you have a labor book or not, and the overwhelming majority of Soviet workers do have them, you could not leave your job all through the war, or for a short period after the war.

But in the last couple of years, they have relaxed on that considerably, although the law has not been revoked.

MR. SCHWARTZ. Isn't that really rivalry of different managers in their desire to get their quotas and bonuses as against the law? But the law still stands in the books.

MR. HAZARD. Do you take it from this, Mr. Magidoff, that the people feel that as a result of the failure to enforce the law there is less reason to resent the government, and therefore this is an indication of strength?

MR. MAGIDOFF. They are regimented well enough even without that law. Even though there has been a definite relaxation in this field, the resentments are many and bitter. I'd like to make just one more point. You say that the Soviet army is not a factor in the Soviet policy. I completely agree with you, and I think that the same applies to the secret police. Like the army, it is just an arm of the Communist Party.

MR. WOLFE. I fundamentally disagree with the last remark. The turning point at which the secret police ceased to be an arm of the party, and the party became in some sense an arm of the secret police, was the years 1936 and 1937. In those years, a majority of the Central Committee was purged by the secret police and by the Central Committee's nominal servant, the Party Secretary.

A majority of the Council of Commissars and a majority of the Central Committee—an overwhelming majority in both cases—were purged by the secret police and the Party Secretary. A majority of the party members, too, were purged. I don't mean they were all killed, but purged from the party, in one form or another, during those crucial years. It represented a coup d'état in the party, in the state, and a coup d'état which was only possible because the secretary of the party, plus the secret police, was able to remove a majority of the state officials, a majority of the party officials, a majority of the general staff, 70 percent of those above the rank of colonel. While I quite agree with the last two speakers that the army plays no independent role, I should say that one key power lever today is the control of the party apparatus, and the other key power lever today is the control of the secret police.

If we were considering the problem of a successor to Stalin, I would say those would be the two groups capable of contending for power. I don't believe the army would be a power lever, because I believe that both the party and the secret police have taken constant precautions to remove at least from the limelight any army official who got too much credit or popularity on the basis of his own actions and not by the mere reflected glory of the party apparatus.

MR. MAGIDOFF. I agree with you about the turning point in '36 or '37. But another turning point followed with the appointment of Lavrenty Beria to the job of heading the secret police. He is the party boss over the secret police.

It is possible that in case of future conflict among individuals for power, one of them might use the secret police to help him to get rid of competitors. But he would emerge to leadership using the secret police only as an arm of the party. He would emerge in power as a Politburo member and not as a chief of secret police.

MR. WOLFE. In form, any struggle for power would be a party struggle, but in content, it would be a struggle between the party machine as an apparatus, and the secret police symbolized by Beria.

Who Runs the USSR?

MR. L. FISCHER. Long ago, unnoticed, the complete centralization of power in Moscow reached its maturity. Nobody takes any responsibility. Everyone passes the buck.

I'd like to call your attention to what must be the result of that. First, the National Republics lose all authority and independence and power. It is one of the causes of their dissatisfaction. That is, they know that not only does the government of the National Republics not have any power, but the party of the National Republics has no power. Where Kiev passes it to Moscow, the Ukrainians pass it to the Russians. This seems to me to raise the whole problem of the national minority, and the mounting friction among the national minorities. Second, it means there is no party lower rank, that the party lower ranks don't have any power. Baku, Tiflis and Omsk pass to Moscow for authority. This is the whole process of the dictatorship; and so I believe that there is no party. I believe it is the law of the totalitarian system that it becomes more totalitarian all the time, and that a one-party system becomes a no-party system. I don't mean to say that the party doesn't exist. Of course, it is there. But it has no power. It has surrendered its power to a group, to a small group, the Politburo and Stalin.

MR. SIMMONS. I don't think there is as yet enough objective evidence to make such an important assertion. There can be no doubt about the monolithic growth of party power over the last thirty years, but that was implicit in the thing even in the days of Lenin.

There is no doubt that since Stalin took power the autocratic position of the Politburo and the leader himself has grown tremendously, but Lenin also could be very much of an autocrat within the party. The point I am making simply is, when you have as many as six million or so people connected with that party, when you realize the enormously vast structure of party control as it is used throughout the length and breadth of the Soviet Union, and when you begin to see over the last six months a gradual intensification of local party structure in the various meetings of the parties of the autonomous republics, all presumably leading to an All-Union Party conference, then one gets the impression that the party has

not just simply been dismissed, and we must take it into consideration in evaluating Soviet strength.

MR. L. FISCHER. Now when it operates by fear of responsibility, which is also the fear of arrest and punishment, then it means that whoever conducts the apparatus of fear is important in the regime. Who is it? It is the secret police. Russia now is a police system.

There is no Communist Party with authority in Russia today. There is only a secret police. Therefore, I believe that Beria is on top.

Before Molotov was displaced from the foreign ministry, I felt that the battle for the succession had started, and the question was not whether Molotov, who apparently is the heir apparent, would become the successor to Stalin, but the problem was how much power the titular successor of Stalin would have. Now, the issue is between Beria and Molotov.

Beria, of course, cannot publicly assume power because he is another Georgian, and if another Georgian succeeded Stalin, they would say, "Aren't there any Russians?"¹ There has to be a Russian successor to Stalin, a Slavic successor, nominally, and the question is now, how much power will that Slavic successor have, and the power will be Beria's, not Molotov's, although they will work together.

MR. HINDUS. Aren't you wrong in assuming that the national minorities, on basic policies, ever had power?

MR. L. FISCHER. They had real power in the 1920's.

MR. HINDUS. I don't believe there is any real transfer of power because there wasn't any to transfer.

MR. L. FISCHER. Of course, they never had very much power. They had a little bit of autonomy. Certainly, they had a lot of cultural autonomy and some economic autonomy. The dissatisfaction did not come out then, but it comes out now when there is an accession of Russian

nationalism. There is a parallel with Moscow and Tito. If Moscow were Communist, Tito would accept Moscow; but Moscow is nationalist. When Moscow becomes Russian nationalist, the national minorities don't like it.

After the Russians had started glorifying Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great, the Tartars resurrected, an epic of theirs called "Eadagay." Alexandrov castigated the Tartars for this in *Bolshevik*. The epic glorified a Tartar Khan. What did Eadagay do? He burnt towns and almost got to Moscow. The Tartars replied, "But you glorify your Russian heroes." They were told, "But you can't glorify your Tartar hero, because he beat up the Russians." The moment you get Russian nationalism, the centralization is resented.

MR. MAGIDOFF. On the one hand, they do continue today to glorify the Russian genius in various cultural fields, but, unlike the attitude during the war period, glorification of Russia as a state has disappeared from the Soviet press. They no longer refer to Russia as "Mother Russia," as they used to during the war. The very word "Russia," in the sense of state, has disappeared from the Soviet press. In Eastern Germany there is actually a decree forbidding the German press and radio to refer to Russians and to Russia as such, and telling them to use the words USSR and Soviet citizens. Culturally, yes, they will glorify the Russian genius; but politically they will not.

Possibly it is an attempt to appease the dissatisfied national minorities, to some degree. Those national minorities never had any power at all.

MR. SCHWARTZ. There is an interesting recent variation in this matter of cultural nationalism. There has been a series of long articles in the *Literary Gazette* emphasizing Uzbek and other Central Asiatic cultures, but attacking the notion that they were linked to Turkish or Iranian culture.

MR. WOLFE. Even in the twenties, Moscow had great fear of a Pan-Turkish movement and worked against it.

V. THE ATTACK ON THE WEST

CHAIRMAN STRAIGHT suggested that the group turn to the general nature of the campaign against "cosmopolitanism" and its causes. Was it caused by psychological preparation for war with the United States? Was it caused by the need to unify the country?

¹The USSR is a federation of nationalities consisting of 16 Union Republics, 130 territories and regions, 15 autonomous republics, etc. The Russian Republic (RSFSR) is by far the largest. The Great Russians number more than half of all the Soviet people and the RSFSR embraces in area more than 75 percent of the Soviet Union. Generally when writers use the term "Russia" they mean it to denote the whole USSR. In this case it refers to one nationality within the Soviet Union. J.P.L.

MR. WOLFE. I should say that probably Mr. Churchill² gave the right explanation of the drive as a whole in his speech the other day. During the war, the Russians came into direct intercourse with other people. In the Grand Alliance, in the occupation of various areas, they were badly shaken in the myths and legends and general beliefs

²Mr. Churchill at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, March 31, 1949: "... they fear the friendship of the West more than its hostility. They cannot afford to allow free and friendly intercourse to grow up between the vast areas they control and the civilization of the West. The Russian people must not see what is going on outside, and the world must not see what goes on inside the Soviet domain. . . ." J.P.L.

they possessed concerning the outside world. They had to be cut off again at the end of the war.

The general policy has been to keep aloof from the rest of the world. But this drive today is new in intensity, new in quality, and in the fact that it spreads through every conceivable field.

That gives rise to a dilemma of the Soviet state today. On the one hand, they try to cut off Soviet scientists from the interchange without which modern science is impossible. On the other hand, they need modern science for the perpetuation of their state.

A Response to Our Policies

MR. SIMMONS. There was obviously a change in the whole direction of Russian ideological warfare about 1945. There have been attempts by various commentators and theorists on Russia, of course, to point out that there has never been any change since 1917, that the whole design of the Soviets toward the West has always been the same.

That they have always criticized the West goes without saying, but there have been varying degrees of criticism, and there have been innumerable statements by Stalin and many other important figures in the Soviet Union about the willingness and the ability of the Soviets to get along with a capitalistic West. They always tried to indicate the possibilities of the coexistence of socialism and a free-enterprise capitalism in one world. There had never been, previous to 1945, anything that even approximated the present ideological campaign against the culture of the West, against everything that the West represents, and particularly against America, and it seems to me that whatever might have been the opinion of Soviet Russia, politically, socially and ideologically, about the West before 1945, something has definitely happened since then, not merely to accentuate or to accelerate their efforts in this respect, but to give quite a different direction to this ideological campaign.

It seems to me that that something had a great deal to do with the gradual formulation in the United States and in the Western European countries of a new international policy. I wouldn't go so far as to connect it up decisively with the Truman Doctrine, the beginnings of the Marshall Plan, and so on, but obviously we ourselves had taken a much more dynamic, a much more positive, definite direction against Russia in the policy of containment, which has contributed to an intensified opposition on their part.

The Russians anticipated not the inevitability of war, but at least the possibility of war, and they began, at that point, to prepare their people psychologically for this possibility.

In one respect, it may not be too extreme to say that the American people and the West, particularly the Americans, were beginning, by 1947, to take the place of the

Nazis in the ideological opposition of the Soviet Union. Now once such a campaign is started in the Soviet Union, one would judge on the basis of past performance that it has to be inclusive. They make no exceptions. It is like a huge juggernaut that rolls on and on, everything being crushed under it, the Anna Louise Strong's, the Bob Magidoffs, and everybody else. They are all sacrificed to this course. It makes no difference.

MR. BERGSON. There are many things about Russian behavior, about the course of their domestic and foreign policy during and since the war, that cannot be explained as a reaction to United States moves, but indicate that even prior to any important United States moves the Russians already envisaged the possibility of a conflict and were preparing for such a possibility.

Even during the war, with large-scale lend-lease, and I suppose as favorable a United States policy toward Russia as has ever been conceivable, the Russians were already taking measures to consolidate their position in Eastern Europe, which, to me, makes sense primarily in terms of their view that another conflict was a real possibility.

MR. SCHWARZ. The whole war was carried on by the Russian government as a separate war. It was the hope of Americans, and also of freedom-loving Russians, that it would be one war. Stalin did not accept that for one moment, that is, the idea of one war. For him, it was a separate war of the Soviet Union in alliance with foreign powers, but with his own aims, and he did not believe in the sincerity of the policy of President Roosevelt, and even less of the policy of Churchill, that they had in mind the idea of one world.

MR. JOSEPH LASH. I cannot agree that the Soviet ideological attack on the West is a response to American foreign policy. Its ideological campaign, in fact, seriously conflicts with the measures it is taking to counter the foreign policy of the Western nations. Its major attack on Western policy now is in the form of an international peace movement headed by intellectuals against the Atlantic Pact. But the intellectuals, even those friendly to the Soviet Union, would never be so critical of the latter as they are just because of the Soviet ideological attack on Western culture.

I bring this up because we cannot get at the true causes of the attack on Western culture unless we first eliminate the false ones. I myself am inclined to believe that among the real causes are the need to immunize the Soviet people from the West and the need to use the arts and culture to further the program of the Communist Party and the Soviet government—which means a mass appeal art and a practical, applied science.

MR. GEORGE FISCHER. My personal experience on the spot at the height of World War II was that American diplomats in Moscow and Army personnel at the Poltava

Air Command were treated by most Soviet bigwigs with distrust and aloofness. Throughout the war, long before 1946, Soviet leaders and the Soviet press consistently ignored or minimized American contributions to the joint war effort, both in aid to Russia and in fighting.

MR. L. FISCHER. We saw in Russia over the years, that they always had enemies, and they needed enemies so as to justify the existence of the dictatorship. Always there was Germany and Japan. Now, they say there are no enemies at home. Germany and Japan have been crushed. If they didn't have enmity, if they didn't have America as a symbol (America, England and France), you would have no way of justifying the dictatorship, the terror, the speed-up and all that. We see it being used in the press as a reason for rallying around the regime.

They certainly don't want war. I don't think there is any ideological preparation because they are afraid not of a war, they are afraid of our superiority.

MR. BARNES. I'd like to make a newspaperman's comment on this anti-cosmopolitanism crusade. Without going into the question of who started it, it does seem to be true that there is something in the crusade that is not anti-American, although there is a great deal of this in it. From where I sit, it seems to be two things: one is what Simonov called the attack on "rootless internationalism," and the second is the attack on what they call formalism.

You can find a counterpart to those ideas in very large sections of the American press. Take the McCormick press or the Hearst press. Trace their editorial position toward (a) world federalism and the UN and (b) intellectuals regarded as "highbrow." You will find the response is almost exactly the same, with the same bitterness and the same rejection, as the Moscow attack on what is called there "cosmopolitanism."

MR. SIMMONS. Carry it out to its logical conclusion. They identify the McCormick and Hearst press with warmakers. It is their fear of these people as warmakers.

MR. BARNES. It could be that both are reflections of a postwar mentality which has relatively little to do with ideology.

Internal Sources of the Campaign

MR. MAGIDOFF. I'd like to say something about the internal sources of this regimentation. We frequently lose sight of the fact that the men in the Kremlin are waging a cold war, not only against the United States, but also against their own people, in the sense that they are trying to win the minds and the souls of their people. During the war certain weaknesses of the Soviet regime became apparent, and they are trying to remedy those.

I think the very nationalism which they seem to be extolling, frightened them. They started a war with the slogan, "Under the banner of Lenin, under the leadership of Stalin, and for the Socialist Fatherland," and so on, but when Harry Hopkins was in Moscow not long after the war started, Stalin told him that he had discovered that the Russian soldiers, the Red Army, were fighting not so much for the Soviet Union as for "Mother Russia," and very soon the entire campaign, all the reports of the fighting, completely changed. Slogans began to appear, "Fight for Mother Russia," and instead of Lenin and Stalin, they called forth the spirits of Peter the Great, Suvarov and Kutuzov.

The men in the Kremlin were realistic enough to harness nationalism for the war, but I think it gave them quite a shock, and very soon after the war ended they stopped this line completely. They are trying to build up a superiority feeling among the Russians in the various scientific and cultural fields, but they definitely are deriding the idea of Russia as a state. The reaction of the national minorities in the USSR and of the satellites probably accounts for that.

They also failed, to a large degree, to uproot religion from the minds of the people. The church, although the backbone of its economic and political power was broken, became such an important factor in the war effort that the Kremlin had to make peace with it. And again, they were realistic enough to make that peace, but it was a shock.

The biggest shock of all was when Soviet soldiers came into contact with the West and saw that they had been told a great big lie about Soviet superiority as compared to the West, and I trace the necessity, as far as the Soviet leaders are concerned, for the current isolation and the terrifying regimentation of the arts, to this shock. The men in the Kremlin demand that the writers and the painters, the moving-picture producers and actors, glorify the Soviet state vis-a-vis the West, from which the people of the USSR are now kept separated by an iron curtain of propaganda and ruthlessly enforced laws.

MR. INKELES. We shouldn't lose sight of the internal aspects. The ideological revival campaign began relatively quietly but with real intensity in 1943, when, apparently becoming more certain about victory, they vigorously revived the schooling of people in Marxism and Leninism. They started to send back to party schools those in the upper and middle strata of the party and members of the intelligentsia, right after the change in the military situation. Since then this Marxist-Leninist indoctrination has grown in intensity all the way along. One part of this story, and a very important part, is what happened in the few years of relative liberty in the early part of the war when a large part of the intelligentsia experienced a degree of freedom that they had hardly known since the beginning of the Stalin era.

When you think about cosmopolitanism, on the whole, it is very difficult for an ordinary Soviet citizen to be a cosmopolitan. What this campaign is directed against is the intelligentsia. You have to ask why, then, such a colossal campaign is directed against such a relatively small number of people. They don't want these people wavering, or getting foolish ideas, and they don't want them operating in a way which indicates they are not

fully convinced about the complete and absolute rightness of what the Soviet Union is doing. And one of the underlying reasons for this concern has to do not with the intelligentsia directly but rather with the social function of the intelligentsia. Because it is that group, serving as writers, journalists, lecturers, propagandists and agitators, which is a major force in shaping the thinking of the Soviet masses.

VI. MARXISM-LENINISM-STALINISM

THE DISCUSSION veered at Chairman Straight's suggestion from the attack on "cosmopolitanism" to an analysis of the basic Soviet ideology—Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism. Had this ideology become a settled part of the thinking of the individual Soviet citizen? Was it a guide to what the Soviet government would do in any specific situation?

MR. G. FISCHER. On the Soviet ideology we are discussing here, a unique source of information has become available to Western students of the USSR since the end of World War II. That is the Soviet refugees, mainly in the American Zone of Germany.

Of the millions of Russian war prisoners and slave laborers in wartime Germany, several hundred thousand have not gone back to the Soviet Union. More recently hundreds of Russians monthly have been deserting the Soviet occupation forces in Germany and Austria. A survey of this postwar Soviet emigration in Europe, which I made for Harvard's Russian Research Center last summer, showed that it represents a remarkable cross-section of the Soviet population, both territorial and occupational.

Of course, it has to be kept in mind that since these Soviet exiles have broken with their former way of life, they may well have a certain bitterness, and their experience in the West might have altered their outlook. But never before has the West had access to such a wide sample of the Soviet population. It seems regrettable, therefore, that so far American institutions interested in the USSR have made little use of this emigration.

As to the question we are dealing with now, one thing stands out, if the evidence of these refugees is even only partially true: the Soviet population has developed a vast immunity to and cynicism about the government's "Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist" ideology and programs.

The constant official appeals to this "Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist" ideology, recent refugees from Russia state, are considered only as propaganda and as a superstructure and a semantic cover-up. Beneath these governmental slogans a large portion of the Soviet people reportedly sees an all-powerful state hierarchy which through the hated Soviet secret police and the Communist Party functionaries oppressively controls everything the population does.

MR. HAZARD. Doesn't every people have a philosophical background from which they operate, from which they decide the questions of the hour that require a solution? Isn't it possible that after 30 years of education in the Soviet system, and many more than 30 for the leadership, which antedates it, there is a residue of this thing called Marxism, which governs Soviet decisions, sometimes perhaps unconsciously?

For example, I understand that those who have interviewed the DP's found universally a feeling that they could never return to private ownership of industry.

MR. G. FISCHER. That is right.

MR. HAZARD. Even if a capitalist foreign government should enforce its rule on Russia, I take it that it would find that the Marxist theory—that the future of the world requires state ownership of industry—has become second nature to all, even to those Russians who hate the guts of Stalin, and outsiders could not uproot this concept.

Now, it is my suggestion that if we could probe deeply enough we would find that there was this residue, call it what you will, which has its origin in the historical doctrines and which governs the thinking of the leadership when it tries to reach a solution. Just as Daniel Boone said, the Indians had their way of thinking, and in order to understand the Indians you had to learn to think Indian; likewise, to understand the Russians, we have got to learn to think in this combination of what is known as Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalinism. When we have achieved the ability to think in those terms, we will be able to guess a little bit more accurately where the Russians are going. The residue of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalinism probably influences decisions in the USSR.

MR. L. FISCHER. Do you identify the residue among the Russian population with that in the Soviet leadership?

MR. HAZARD. Of course, it becomes thinner and thinner the farther down you go.

MR. L. FISCHER. To what extent do the Soviet people accept this ideology? John, you are quite right when you

say that all of these anti-Soviet, ex-Soviet-system people accept state ownership, nationalization. But equally, and for Russia, which is even now a peasant country, they all reject collectivization. There is not a single exception. So here is a contradiction. They all accept socialist doctrines in industry; they all reject socialism in agriculture.

There is another very interesting thing about the Soviet DP's abroad. I hate to generalize, but a large body of them are religious, and you can go into their barracks around Munich and see icons in a great many of them. In other words, they have rejected the Soviet teaching. In the twenties, the late twenties, what one found in Russia was that the intelligentsia, the Russian intelligentsia, was always anti-religious.

They hated the church, which was a corrupt church. In the late thirties, the intelligentsia in the Soviet Union became religious as a protest against the regime. The regime recognized this and made concessions to the church in the late thirties, and especially in the forties, during the war.

So I rather doubt whether the Soviet regime really influences the minds of its people. It rather inspires or provokes self-immunization, and there can be no understanding of what the Soviet people are thinking, of what the atmosphere in Russia is, unless you say that the Russians do not accept this thing. If the people believed and still thought that Stalin was the great leader, they wouldn't do this. They wouldn't have Stalin on the front page every day. They feel that they haven't put it over, and they are still trying to put it over.

MR. WOLFE. Even to us who follow the Soviet press steadily, it is startling—if you take an analysis of any week in the life of Ivan Ivanich in which he is trying to learn from the Soviet press what is happening in the world today—how much is taken up with Stalin adulation. He gets up on January 1; it is Saturday. He says, "Well, what is the world news?" The world's greatest newspaper is picked up and read. Here is a letter to Stalin, a second letter to Stalin, a third letter to Stalin—all together occupying more than two-thirds of the front page of a four-page newspaper. That's front-page on January 1. [Mr. Wolfe then displayed successive issues of *Pravda* in which letters to Stalin comprised a major part of the paper.]

Now, what is this really? What does this represent? I should say in a single word that this represents a continuous war of nerves on the Soviet people.

Essentially the Stalin cult is a method of getting the Russian people to accept voicelessly and without criticism everything the regime does. It represents the failure of any element of Soviet democracy.

MR. INKELES. The role of Marxism in Soviet society must be seen not as pure ideology, for it has been greatly altered by Lenin and Stalin, but as a kind of everyday-living doctrine. It is a kind of social creed, and is probably understood in the same limited way Americans under-

stand the American creed. But the belief in the American creed is an important element in keeping our social system going, and to the same degree belief in the Soviet doctrine, however imperfect Marxism it may be, is probably a major element in keeping their system going.

The point which Mr. Hazard made is a very important one. It may be that as far as the particulars and fine points are concerned, the Soviet population does not grasp the ideology. At the same time, it is important to keep in mind that to a very significant degree over a course of 30 years they probably do, by and large, accept a great many of the fundamental postulates, such as the national ownership of industry. This is a constant factor that will have to be taken into account, no matter what the future happens to be.

In addition, there is another element, which is that Marxist philosophy, as developed by Stalin at least, is essentially an orthodoxy. Certain characteristics have to be present or else it won't work. One has a kind of priesthood which determines what "the book" actually says. If you put the book back in the hands of the people, they may interpret it themselves. Consequently, you get this tremendously elaborate campaign to attempt to indoctrinate the crucial people in society in Marxism-Leninism, as Stalin understands it.

To a significant degree, although by no means completely, this indoctrination program is reasonably successful. After a while, most of the people probably come to think of actions in the Soviet Union within the framework of this type of program. The political and economic pressures bring doubts to some, or if they go abroad, they may waver. This is another characteristic difficulty of orthodoxy, for when they waver in an orthodoxy, they may swing all the way over; that is, they may go against the orthodoxy with which they were identified. That is an element of constant weakness in the Soviet system. If you do have an orthodoxy, and if it gets shaken, your faith in the whole system is shaken.

Ideology and Russian History

MR. CYRIL BLACK. I wish to say something about this continuity of Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist doctrine from a historical point of view.

Communist institutions in Russia will be stable in so far as they are in the Russian tradition and resemble what Russia has always been doing in the past. The thing, for a historian, which is most notable about Stalin's Russia is that it resembles the old Russia in so many respects. The loyalty of the Russian people to any regime will depend on the extent to which it resembles what they have always had. Marxism has been stable in Russia because it has been adaptable to Russian conditions.

I received the impression from contacts with Russian officials that changes in the Russian party structure in Moscow would not affect the stability of Russia any more

than the great purges in the thirties did, because the Russian system which exists, characterized by administrative centralization and state intervention in economic life, has existed for a great many centuries and has survived a great many assassinations of Czars and commissars.

An intellectualized approach to doctrinal differences within the party tends to overemphasize the effects of these quarrels on the strength or weakness of the Russian system.

MR. WOLFE. It troubles me very much that people and perhaps I myself have too much stressed the line of continuity between the old Russia and the new without simultaneously emphasizing the degree of break.

What is new in the new Russia is the totality of its regime. The ancient despotism was a limited despotism. It was ruthless in suppressing opposition and disagreement in the particular spheres in which it was able to control and aspire to control. It couldn't dream of controlling the totality of life. It was a limited despotism.

This new regime has a new twentieth-century apparatus that was never possible in the history of Russia. It requires swift means of communication, so that you can transport armed men to any part of the country within a very short period; it requires loudspeakers in every square and in every clubhouse, so that the same idea may be penetrating every head simultaneously throughout a vast area; it requires universal literacy and a widely distributed press so that everybody will be reading the same slogans at the same time; it requires universal military service; it requires labor conscription; it requires a knowledge of psychology and propaganda technique to manipulate men's minds; it requires a number of mechanical devices which only the twentieth century has produced.

Changes in Marxist Doctrine

MR. WOLFE undertook to trace some of the essential changes that have taken place in Marxist doctrine in its development through Lenin and Stalin.

Nineteenth-century Marxian socialism thought of itself as the heir of the eighteenth-century enlightenment, advocating "the use of critical reason in examining all authority, dogmas and institutions and the planning for a rational society." Second, it criticized as incomplete but never rejected democracy, regarding socialism as extending it to the economic field. Third, it emphasized the "humanist" aspect of socialism—it would redress the dehumanization of man caused by subordinating man to the machine, which he had created to serve, not master him. Fourth, it regarded itself as directed toward the realization of equalitarianism. Finally, it regarded itself as the heir of man's

long struggle for freedom. "So, enlightenment, plus democracy, plus humanism, plus equalitarianism, plus freedom, would be Marx's own conception of the aims and characteristics of the socialist movement."

Lenin was a transition figure, said Mr. Wolfe. He wasn't scrupulous about blood flowing outside of the party, but within the party his first injunction was, "Let no blood flow between us." He handled party oppositionists in a comparatively humane way. Second, he sought a collective leadership. This was the driving idea in that last document known as "Lenin's Testament." A third characteristic of Lenin was his anti-imperialism. He recognized the independence of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Finland, Poland and even Georgia. Finally, Lenin believed that immediately upon the seizure of power the state would begin to wither away.

Stalin from 1931 rejected the concept of "equalitarianism" as the "worst enemy of socialism." He advanced the theory that in the period of capitalist encirclement, the socialist state, far from withering away, would grow stronger until the whole world becomes Soviet. A third distinguishing characteristic of Stalinism is the blood purge within the party and government. And fourth, under Stalin you have had the development of an openly sanctioned leader cult and personal dictatorship.

MR. L. FISCHER. Soviet foreign policy, which is so important in the estimation of strength and weakness, is a combination of both opportunism and expediency on the one hand, and a doctrinaire approach on the other. For instance, Lenin, as you know, admitted publicly that he had made a mistake about the invasion of Poland in 1920. He thought there would be a revolution. It explained the failure of the whole war in 1920.

It is striking that Stalin made the same mistake in Finland in 1939.

He marched into Finland with bands, thinking that the Finnish proletariat would rise, and we know that every Finn, workers and others, fought against the Russians.

Now, they make the same miscalculation about the West. Litvinov told me some time in the twenties that when the Armistice was signed on November 11, 1918, he knew the world revolution was finished, because the moment you got peace, the population of the foreign countries (this is not Russia)—the population of Europe—acquired a vested interest, an emotional desire, so he said, for security and just getting along, and it wouldn't revolt.

So, as I interpret Soviet foreign policy since the war, since 1945, Stalin decided that after this war he would not give Europe an armistice. He would try, through civil wars, political strikes, riots, economic difficulties, to create a situation and a mental climate in which people would revolt. The West has, however, by its constructive meas-

ures, created the armistice, which Stalin wouldn't give Europe, and that now is forcing the Russians, the Soviet regime, to grope for some new orientation in Europe.

Now, the point is that their doctrinaire approach has led them into an endless number of mistakes in foreign policy which are costly to the regime.

I think there is another inheritance from Marx and from Lenin, and that is the vehemence of argument, the intolerance of opposition, the dogmatism. It is true that Lenin didn't destroy the opposition—Lenin at one Congress demolished Bukharin, and when they walked out, they put their arms around each other.

But fierce intolerance is the inheritance of Marxism and Leninism, and it spreads out now into the most rigid dictatorship. There, you have a direct inheritance.

On imperialism, for instance, there has been a complete departure from Lenin, because Lenin was anti-Russian imperialist in practice. He gave away rights in Persia; the extra-territorial rights in China; he gave the Baltic states their freedom, and so on. Stalin has reversed that completely. He has just reversed Lenin, and what Lenin gave up to Persia, Stalin tries to get back. But here that has to be modified, too.

The Soviet regime is anti-other imperialisms. It continues to be anti-imperialist when it is British, French or American imperialism, but it has created an anti-Leninist imperialism of its own.

MR. LEWIS FEUER. I'd like to relate some of the ideology to our discussion of economics yesterday. From one standpoint, this philosophy provides a sort of language habit which persists. The content can change very much in accordance with the economic demand. Abram Bergson, in his book on Soviet wages, made a very interesting comparison between the American economic and technological situation in 1904 with the Soviet economic and technological situation in 1928. Now, that was purely on the economic and technological level. The interesting thing is that the comparison continues, likewise, and is valid, it seems to me, in a large measure, on the philosophic and ideological plane. During the early 1900's in the United States, the philosophy of John Dewey and William James was being presented, with all its crudities. That was the period when Bertrand Russell was

denouncing Dewey and James, as he still does, as the philosophers of American technology, as the philosophers who defined truth in purely practical terms.

That is also the period in American life when pure science was very much in disrepute, when great practical achievements were in the air, when men like Edison and Burbank were the exemplars of American scientific achievement, at least to the popular mind.

During the thirties in Soviet society, it seems to me that although Marxian language was still used, just as Dewey had continued to use the Hegelian language to promulgate his thought, in the midst of this Marxian usage you get a kind of pragmatism arising, a definition of truth in terms of its contribution to immediate practical utility, a criticism of pure science, and the like.

In recent years, this technological pragmatism has been overlaid with national pragmatism. It seems to me that this technological pragmatism is a large part of the meaning of what we call the Marxist ideology in the Soviet Union today. It is something we have to consider in forming an estimate of what the strength of the Soviet Union is, what the ideology will contribute in terms of scientific strength in the future.

We shouldn't underestimate the amount of achievement that can come from that source. One can overestimate the amount of advanced theoretical science which is needed to build up the technological resources of a country. It seems to me that just as America, in its period of great capital construction, proceeded on a very empirical basis, so Soviet technological strength can accomplish a good deal in the way of bringing forward particular resources into availability for the community.

The situation in science, however, in the latter part of the twentieth century may differ from the first part of the twentieth century: namely, technology will probably rest much more on pure science than it has in the past. The Industrial Revolution, it is well known, was largely accomplished by men who had very little knowledge of pure science. That was just the first stage of the development of industry, and in this new stage of industry, namely, the stage in which atomic energy and the like will be important, it seems to me there will be an element of weakness manifesting itself in the coming years in economic and technological achievement.

VII. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF TITOISM

CHAIRMAN STRAIGHT asked about the relationship of the Soviet economy to the satellite nations. One hears, he said, a good deal about siphoning out the resources of the satellite nations.

MR. SCHWARTZ. It is quite obvious that with the new Council for Mutual Economic Aid there is going to be

closer integration between the Soviet and the satellites' economies.

MR. BERGSON. There is no question that there will be closer integration than there was before the war. There already is a closer integration of the satellite economies, or the Eastern European economies, with Russia than

there was before the war. The Russians participate in the trade of Eastern Europe to a much greater extent than they did before the war. As a matter of fact, before the war their participation was quite insignificant. I think about one percent of some Eastern European trade was with the Russians.

MR. ANDREW GYORGY. Titoism is significant in limiting the effectiveness of the Cominform in both its doctrinaire and its opportunistic phases. It developed into a significant thorn in the side of both the Soviet regime and such minor "footnotes" as the Albanians.

Titoism weakens the Cominform, which was tremendously publicized as the first and most immediate reaction to the Marshall Plan; it also leads to the springing up of a series of nationalistic campaigns and movements, definitely harmful to the Soviet Union. Openly antagonizing the Cominform, it can lead to a significant power struggle which could roll back Russian power and threaten the objectives of Soviet foreign policy.

MR. L. FISCHER. Is it true that Tito could have done this because he was farther away and strongest? How could the Poles do it, or the Rumanians, or the Bulgarians?

MR. GYORGY. I am thinking mostly in terms of an intellectual epidemic, rather than military resistance, which is very doubtful in those countries. The resistance of the intelligentsia would have tremendous impact in appealing to all other Titoist elements.

MR. BLACK. As regards the Soviet position in Eastern Europe, it seems clear that the Soviet Union gained many immediate economic benefits from its occupation of those countries after the war. They have always enjoyed a higher standard of living than Russia, with the possible exception of Albania, or the eastern Polish districts which Russia has now annexed.

Russia drained them by various methods. The armistice terms, for instance, gave Russia broad economic privileges in Rumania and Hungary. In particular, Russia was able to confiscate German properties, which meant substantially all foreign properties, since the Germans had already taken over other foreign holdings during the war.

Moreover, half of Russian foreign trade in the last couple of years has been with the countries of Eastern Europe. The great bulk of that trade is handled through barter agreements, specific exchanges of goods, although there are instances of Russia's giving materials to those countries, like grain to Poland, and so on. In drawing up these barter agreements, the Russians generally take full advantage of their superior bargaining power. On the whole, they pay very low prices for the goods they receive. In the case of one product, Bulgarian tobacco, it is known specifically that they bought it at a very low price and sold it in New York at a great profit. Moreover, they bought it in exchange for cotton, and sold it for dollars.

It is undoubtedly a source of real pride to the Russian people and government that they have these Eastern European states as friends. It is probably an element of domestic strength for the Soviet regime that it is able to win and hold foreign allies.

But these states are valuable as allies only if Russia is able to dominate them through the Communist Parties, and here they are having trouble. The middle classes and armies have been absorbed or crushed, but so far the Communists have not been able to win control over the peasants, who are in the great majority. Like the Bolsheviks in Russia in 1917, local Communist leaders in Eastern Europe have tended to bribe the peasants rather than threaten them. Their main emphasis has been on land reform, which is just the opposite of collectivization. They are only now turning to collectivization under Russian pressure, although in some countries compromise measures have already been attempted. They haven't made a full-fledged effort, such as Russia made in the 1930's, in any country, so far as I know. This failure of the Communists to nationalize agriculture, which is a failure to establish full political control over the peasant masses, seems to me the main point of Soviet weakness in Eastern Europe.

Some day the Russians may possibly want to call on these countries for a great effort of one sort or another, and the Soviet leaders realize that they will not be fully dependable as allies so long as the peasants retain their economic independence. Even today, after four years in power, the Communists have not been very successful in extending control over the village areas. They control the cities and the instruments of power: the police and the armies. But they still handle the peasantry with great caution. To establish full control over the peasants, the Communists will have to take away their land. This will be a major struggle which local leaders wish to postpone, despite Russian urging.

A further element of Russian weakness in Eastern Europe is that they are having difficulty in dominating the local Communist Parties. The reason for this appears to be that many Communist leaders feel they have been betrayed. Most of them joined the party in the expectation that it would be able to raise the standard of living of the average citizen. I knew a few of them personally, and they sincerely believed that the Soviet system would bring their peoples all the good things this world has to offer. Now they have discovered that the Russians are only interested in the contribution their countries can make to Soviet power.

Many local Communists wish to industrialize their countries, trade with the West when they can benefit by it, and curry the favor of the peasants until collectivization can be accomplished without a social upheaval. This seems to be the essence of Titoism. Their Soviet masters, however, think entirely in terms of political control. They oppose policies which might give their satellites an independent prosperity, and instead stress the greater

integration of political power which collectivization would provide.

A split has thus developed in all the Communist Parties. Dominant personalities like Tito, who did so much to build up Communism in these countries during and after the war, are being replaced wherever possible by bureaucratic types who owe their position solely to the support of the Soviet security police. The great weakness of Russia's position in Eastern Europe today is not that the Communist regimes will be overthrown by some non-Communist opposition group, but rather that in each country important Communists will at some point refuse to take orders from Moscow. There are many issues over which such breaks might occur, but Soviet insistence on collectivization seems to be the most important of these.

MR. SCHWARZ. I think with Tito it is a special case, and nobody could imitate Tito among the satellite countries. Yugoslavia was not occupied by the Red Army. All the others were, occupied, militarily and politically. In

Yugoslavia, however, there existed no Russian army and no influential Russian advisers. Tito himself, during the war, remained in the country and created his own military organization, his own apparatus, his own police organization, and that is the source of his strength.

He could not be replaced. Of course, he also has a favorable geographical position, and he is favored by the strong nationalism of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia was never subjugated completely, either by the Turks or the Germans. This idea of national independence is deeply rooted. There is no more faithful Stalinist than Tito was himself, but he became the instrument of the idea of national independence. It is impossible to have anything like this in Rumania, or in Czechoslovakia.

MR. WOLFE. The Stalin cult has received its first serious blow as a cult through Tito's resistance, and as I understand both Stalin and the mechanics of the cult, I think he must break Tito, or the prestige of the Stalin cult on an international scale will be steadily undermined.

VIII. CONCLUSION

CHAIRMAN STRAIGHT. I think at this point, unless you want to go on, it would be good if we could spend maybe half an hour trying to relate the entire discussion, and getting an over-all summation of relative strength and weakness. This time, we may possibly speak with an eye to the role of Russia in the entire world picture.

MR. L. FISCHER. I don't know whether the Soviet leadership wants a war. I'd be inclined to say no. I am sure that the Soviet people don't want a war, and it looks to me as though the Soviet government knows that it must not move its armed forces across its frontier in the present circumstances.

I don't think that there is a war coming in the foreseeable future. I don't think we are going to start a war. We don't want to. I don't think Stalin or the Soviet dictatorship is going to start a war. They are too weak.

There remains the question of the cold war, that is, antagonism without actual use of armed force.

Everything that I see happening in Russia, and in Europe, and in America, leads me to believe that the Russians—that the Soviet regime has nothing to give. It lost Tito because it did not have materials to give. It did not have politics to give. It did not have ideas to give. It did not have internationalism. If it is a clash between Russian nationalism and Yugoslav nationalism, Russia cannot win.

The Russians haven't the wherewithal for victory in the cold war in Europe, and they are afraid of it. They know it, and I see now an attempt at reorientation of Soviet foreign policy, so I think that in Europe, which is the crucial thing in a question of war or no war, Russia is

losing because of her material, political and ideological weakness, and she cannot win the cold war.

So I would summarize, very hurriedly, that there is not going to be a shooting war in the foreseeable future, and Russia cannot win the cold war.

CHAIRMAN STRAIGHT. The fact that she is losing the cold war, does that mean she will be inclined to withdraw contact with the Western world? Inclined to pull out of the UN, since she can't use it, inclined to give up trying to break up the Western coalition, inclined to close ranks of the satellites and withdraw?

MR. L. FISCHER. They are really going to try now to make sure that there are no more Titos. They are going to make sure, at least, of their empire, and perhaps reconcile themselves to the fact that they cannot go any further.

Of course, what we have left out—it is a subject in itself—is Germany. The heart of Europe is Germany. The Litvinov school was anti-Germany. Litvinov often said to me, "I want to have good relations with France and England." But Stalin, and Lenin, and others, said that Germany is Europe, and now the German situation is decisive.

When Stalin says to Kingsbury Smith, "I want to meet Truman; I will lift the blockade if you desist from your attempts to organize Western Germany," what is that? It is an attempt to do through diplomacy what they have tried to do through politics and failed. They have failed to get Germany through politics. Germany is slipping away from them. Now, they do not want us to organize Germany. They are afraid that we are.

In other words, now, through diplomacy, they will attempt and they will make repeated offers for an arrangement with us, which will prevent us from organizing Europe.

As to the UN, Russia is not cooperating in the UN. It would be a silly, futile and self-defeating demonstration for the Russians to withdraw from the UN. Why should they? They gain everything from it. They can delay action, throw a monkey wrench into the machinery.

MR. HAZARD. If, as Mr. Fischer says, the Soviet government is not prepared to start a shooting war, and if they are losing the cold war, isn't it possible that our foreign policy wants to be reviewed to make certain that it is designed in the light of those facts, and that those persons who think in terms of a shooting war, of a foreign army which we have to oppose now—that those persons do not get the ascendancy and that the Atlantic Pact be thought of in terms of long-range defense, rather than an immediate defense through offense, and that kind of thing. I would entirely agree that there is no immediate prospect of a shooting war, particularly as a result of the Tito affair, and the fact that the cold war is not going well.

Therefore, I have felt that we want to be careful in our own country not to exhaust our resources unnecessarily in preparing for a shooting war in the immediate future if it isn't going to be forced upon us.

MR. L. FISCHER. I would like to applaud what you said.

MR. SIMMONS. I suppose the whole direction of the conference on this precise theme of weaknesses and strengths in the Soviet Union is connected in our mind with the kind of policy that is abroad today, that is the general theory of opposition on the part of the combined West, the notion that containment would accelerate weaknesses, if they exist, and thus bring about eventually an attitude of compromise or possibly internal revolt in the Soviet Union, thus solving the whole situation.

There is, or has been, an air of unreality about some of the discussions in the sense that they have been necessarily directed pretty much at an estimation of strengths and weaknesses in the Soviet Union, while not always taking into consideration that those strengths and weaknesses are profoundly affected by outside events, that is, by the total direction of international policy.

The one thing that has always seemed essential to me in my study of the Soviet Union is that the party and the group that leads it have never had any intention of immolating themselves on the altar of any doctrine, whether it be Marxist or anything else. Their main concern is to preserve their own existence. That means that they are going to do everything in their power to avoid any international difficulty that will result in war, for war at the present stage or in the immediate future would seem to spell disaster for the Soviet Union. All the tactics of the

Communist Party, the whole development of the Soviet state, would seem to point to that definite conclusion.

Therefore, in trying to estimate these weaknesses and strengths, of which a great many have been pointed out on both sides, the whole economic situation, as we discovered yesterday in Mr. Bergson's talk, would indicate that there are certain strengths. Mr. Schwarz pointed out certain weaknesses. My own feeling is that it is rather disturbing in the face of this balance that when Stalin put forward a proposal for a peace discussion, his sincerity was not tested by positive proposals from the West. I think we should have offered them. There is a good deal of loose talk going around about "peace offensives," but if all peace feelers from the East are to be treated as mere propaganda and all peace suggestions from the West

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as appeasement, what is there left?

MR. L. FISCHER. Actions.

MR. SIMMONS. I don't think we in America and the people in Russia believe that all of Europe is expendable, which would be the case should war come, and that Communism and capitalism must simply fight to the end in a war of catastrophic proportions.

MR. BLACK. We are in some danger of getting into a paradox here in summarizing our discussion. In so far as we have discovered elements of weakness in Russia, they seem to come from two sources. One is organic, such as the party, the low standard of living, and so on, which we cannot affect directly, but only in an indirect fashion, and even then not very immediately.

The second source of weakness is in competition with the West, and Russia has made the retreats you pointed out in the face of united and firm stands, not military stands, but political stands. They withdrew in the face of words, or little more, in Iran, and even in Eastern Europe they have made some concessions.

Now, we are in danger of saying that since Russia has elements of weakness, we should relax the very foreign policy which has permitted us to make these gains.

MR. SIMMONS. That isn't the point I had in mind. I must stress that. I would revert to John Hazard's point that in so far as we have been able, by the Marshall Plan and even by the present Pact, to indicate to the Soviets that we mean business, well and good, but if the military aspects of our policy are going to lead to a clash, then we are in danger.

MR. HAZARD. I say to the extent that we have a foreign policy which is designed to meet an attack immediately, and Louis Fischer's analysis indicates that we don't have to face that attack immediately, we can relax that aspect of our foreign preparation.

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
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MR. BLACK, I put it in a somewhat different way. In so far as signs of internal weakness or Russian withdrawal are concerned, which has certainly occurred since 1947, and since 1946, in so far as that has been a result of our building up power in the West, power which is primarily political and only partly military power—in so far as we should maintain and increase that power. Power should be maintained, but the direction and the use of the power should be guided by the fact that the Russians will withdraw in the face of over-all power.

MR. L. FISCHER. If we say we are in a period of war prevention, and that war can be prevented, which is my thesis, then we don't have friendly relations with Franco, because friendly relationships with Franco would lose us support in France, Germany, Italy and England, and we would, to that extent, lose the cold war and give arguments to the Communists.

Also, if war is not inevitable, then we don't have to use the Nazis, or those top-drawer German tycoons. If we want to beat the Communists and the Russians in the cold war, then we have got to get the German people on our side. In other words, the fact we can prevent the war should alter our whole diplomacy and keep the military out of making foreign policy.

MR. SIMMONS. The latter is entirely agreed to.

MR. WOLFE. The immediate efforts toward peace require: first, continued European recovery; second, the working out of some sort of plan for plugging up the power vacuum in Asia. Truman's forth inaugural point, if it has any meaning, must above all be applied to Asia. And third: we must keep the gates open to permit Russia to have a change of heart, if it should decide that it can get more out of participating in recovery than out of trying to block it. Then we must reopen the gates to give economic aid to Russia as a part of a general reconstruction of Europe and Asia.

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